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INTRODUCTION 
In the modern era, the world faces a stark paradox in understanding the risk 
of fast-moving pathogens. While science brings enormous acumen for 
discovering and developing countermeasures (vaccines and pharmaceuticals), 
the potential for explosive pandemics has never been greater.1 Why? 
Globalization propels pathogens more rapidly than ever across borders, 
regions, and the world. Mass migration, intercontinental travel, urbanization, 
and intense animal–human interchange facilitate the emergence of microbes 
from the forests and animal life to humans; then, these dangerous microbes 
spread uncontrollably.2  
These dynamics have resulted in a significant increase in outbreaks since 
1980: 12,012 outbreaks of 215 infectious diseases were recorded between 1980 
and 2013, accounting for more than 44 million cases in 219 countries.3 In 
recent years, the world has experienced a series of health crises spanning 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle Eastern respiratory 
syndrome (MERS), Ebola virus disease, and novel avian (H5N1) or human 
(H1N1 and H7N9) influenzas.4 At the height of each crisis, politicians often 
overreact (e.g., implementing unnecessary travel and trade restrictions or 
quarantines).5 In interpandemic periods, authorities underprepare. Lurching 
between complacency and panic is a dysfunctional strategy; while scientists 
cannot predict when the next pandemic will occur, or the exact pathogen at 
play, there will be a destructive pandemic in the foreseeable future.6  
Naturally occurring infectious diseases are not the only threat. In an age of 
terrorism, it is not just guns, explosives, and chemical or radiologic hazards 
that destabilize communities and countries; there is also the prospect of 
 
 1 See Lawrence O. Gostin & Ana S. Ayala, Global Health Security in an Era of Explosive Pandemic 
Potential, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2017). 
 2 See COMM’N ON A GLOB. HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., 
SECRETARIAT, THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE CRISES 1 (2016) [hereinafter THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY]. 
 3 See INT’L WORKING GRP. ON FIN. PREPAREDNESS, FROM PANIC AND NEGLECT TO INVESTING IN 
HEALTH SECURITY: FINANCING PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AT A NATIONAL LEVEL 6 (2017); Katherine F. 
Smith et al., Global Rise in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks, J. ROYAL SOC’Y. INTERFACE, Dec. 6, 2014, 
at 1, 2. 
 4 See Emergencies Preparedness, Response: Disease Outbreaks by Year, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/en/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 5 See, e.g., Johanna Neuman, Swine Flu: Time to Close the U.S.-Mexico Border?, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 
28, 2009, 8:10 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/04/swine-flu-time-to-close-the-
usmexico-border.html (responding to the threat of swine flu from Mexico by proposing to close the United 
States-Mexico border). 
 6 See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 17. 
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accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens. One week after the 
September 11th terrorist event, anthrax spores were mailed to media and U.S. 
senators, killing five people, infecting seventeen others, and grinding the postal 
system to a halt.7 In 2004, a Russian scientist (working at one of two known 
repositories of smallpox virus) died after accidentally pricking herself with a 
needle contaminated with the Ebola virus.8  
Given the proliferation of scientific information on the internet, reputable 
scientists can create dangerous pathogens. So-called “garage” laboratory 
scientists can also acquire this skill, by which individuals handle highly 
virulent microbes without adequate scientific training and security 
precautions.9 As early as 1994, researchers genetically sequenced the extinct 
and deadly smallpox virus, openly publishing the results.10 A researcher in 
Canada recently synthesized the extinct horsepox virus—a cousin of the 
smallpox virus—using commercially available genetic materials.11 New 
genetic technologies make it possible to recreate or “enhance” pathogens, 
making them more transmissible, virulent, or both.12 
Even more worrying is when pathogens evolve and adapt to form resistant 
strains. Pathogens that gain resistance to most, or all, antimicrobial 
medications could unravel the gains made by modern medicine, returning the 
world to a pre-antibiotic era. The prospect of losing once highly effective drugs 
goes well beyond emerging novel infections: antimicrobial resistance makes 
common hospital-acquired infections (e.g., staph infections) potentially lethal, 
and undermines progress against enduring infectious diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—causing a drumbeat of suffering and 
death worldwide.13 
 
 7 Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded, NPR (Feb. 15, 2011, 11:00 AM) http://www.npr.org/ 
2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded. 
 8 Judith Miller, Russian Scientist Dies in Ebola Accident at Former Weapons Lab, N.Y. TIMES (May 
25, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/world/russian-scientist-dies-in-ebola-accident-at-former-
weapons-lab.html. 
 9 See Heidi Ledford, Life Hackers, 467 NATURE 650, 650 (2010). 
 10 See Robert F. Massung et al., Analysis of the Complete Genome of Smallpox Variola Major Virus 
Strain Bangladesh-1975, 201 VIROLOGY 215 (1994). 
 11 Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Scientists Synthesize Smallpox Cousin in Ominous Breakthrough, 
WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2017/07/07/ 
scientists-synthesize-smallpox-cousin-in-ominous-breakthrough/?utm_term=.caa2b275e57a. 
 12 See generally Jan van Aken & Edward Hammond, Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons, 4 
EMBO REP. S57 (2003) (providing a systematic overview of the potential impact of biotechnology on the 
development of biological weapons). 
 13 See Antimicrobial Resistance, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ 
fs194/en/ (last updated Sept. 2016). 
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There is another truth that society must confront: dangerous pathogens will 
never be conquered. Despite awe-inspiring scientific advancement, pathogens 
are an enduring part of the ecosystem. While public health has achieved 
notable victories such as the eradication of smallpox and the near elimination 
of wild polio, microbes have had millennia to learn how to adapt and survive.14 
Instead, “smart” public health does not pretend to be able to eliminate 
infectious disease threats, but rather ameliorates the risk through rapid 
detection and effective response before outbreaks spread widely within 
communities, countries, and regions.  
Part I explains the rising global hazard posed by infectious diseases, while 
emphasizing the extent to which the international community continually 
underestimates and underinvests in pandemic planning and response—despite 
the clear lessons of animal and human history. It argues that the need to shore 
up preparedness is more acute than ever. The world faces looming threats, 
namely rising populations, urbanization, mass migration, rapid travel and trade, 
climate change, weak states, and ethno-nationalism. Through modest 
investments, the international community could ensure greater global health 
security. Yet, political resolve to work cooperatively and internationally to 
build a more secure world may be waning with the rise of ethno-nationalistic 
populism, which cuts against the most important value in global health: mutual 
solidarity. A nationalist “country first” ideology risks destabilizing global 
action against fast-moving epidemics. 
Part II offers a blueprint for a more secure future—a strategy that keeps the 
world safe from pathogenic threats that are equal to, or exceed, any other 
hazard facing humankind. States must migrate from the current reactive 
approach to one of thoughtful preparedness. What would it take to create a 
decidedly more secure world? What steps must we put in place to bolster 
defenses against infectious diseases? What are the political, financial, and 
regulatory obstacles standing in the way?  
This Article proposes a new paradigm for global preparedness, rejecting 
the current narrow silos of health assistance, such as disease-specific 
interventions or eradication. Global health security requires economic 
investment, strong international institutions, resilient national health systems, 
targeted research and development, and effective communication with affected 
 
 14 Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children–United States, 1990-1998, 48 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 246 (1999); see also R.G. Webster & D.J. Hulse, Microbial 
Adaptation and Change: Avian Influenza, 23 REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE [REV. SCI. & TECH.] 453 
(2004) (Fr.) (discussing the ability of the influenza virus to genetically evolve). 
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populations. We place particular emphasis on reform of the World Health 
Organization (WHO or Organization) and emergency response within the U.N. 
system. The values that ought to guide future action include cooperative action, 
shared responsibility, equity and fairness, and global norms that are respected 
and enforced. 
I. SHORT-SIGHTED POLICIES: UNDERESTIMATING THE THREAT 
At the 2017 Munich Security Conference, Bill Gates observed, “Whether it 
occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, . . . a fast-moving 
airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year. 
And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such 
an outbreak in the next 10–15 years.”15 Few other events—not war, a 
devastating earthquake, or conventional terrorism—pose the same probability 
and severity of risk. 
Yet, politicians careen between panic and complacency. Microbial threats 
garner scant political attention or resources until they hit a critical threshold.16 
Financing global health preparedness represents only a fraction of the sums 
devoted to more conventional threats, such as chemical, nuclear, and even 
conventional threats from terrorism.17 
This dynamic is illogical. Infectious diseases are not a new or unexpected 
threat, but have been a constant presence throughout human history, causing 
untold suffering and innumerable deaths. Ancient Egyptian mummies harbor 
traces of tuberculosis,18 while the fourteenth century Black Death took over 
20 million lives in Europe alone—nearly a third of the continent’s 
population.19 The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 infected a third of the world’s 
people, with an estimated 50 million deaths.20 During the Crimean War (1845–
1856), approximately ten times as many British soldiers died from dysentery 
 
 15 Bill Gates, BILL GATES: A New Kind of Terrorism Could Wipe Out 30 Million People in Less Than 
a Year–And We Are Not Prepared, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
bill-gates-op-ed-bio-terrorism-epidemic-world-threat-2017-2. 
 16 See Ed Yong, The Deadly Panic-Neglect Cycle in Pandemic Funding, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/panic-neglect-pandemic-funding/543696/. 
 17 See THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 1. 
 18 Andreas G. Nerlich et al., Molecular Evidence for Tuberculosis in an Ancient Egyptian Mummy, 350 
LANCET 1404 (1997). 
 19 Black Death, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/black-death (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 20 Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics, 12 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15 (2006). 
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than from battle; during the Boer War (1899–1902), the ratio was five to one.21 
Similarly, uncontrolled infectious diseases caused two-thirds of all deaths 
during the American Civil War—predominantly pneumonia, typhoid, diarrhea 
and dysentery, and malaria.22 While the above epidemics took place in the pre-
antimicrobial era, they also occurred before air travel and globalization. And 
we now face the frightening prospect of gravitating to a pre-antimicrobial era.  
Yet, our ability to contain disease has been transformed in many ways. For 
much of history, humans’ primary response to infectious disease was 
reactive—trying in vain to separate infected persons from the population—
whether through quarantines, cordon sanitaire (a guarded area preventing 
people or animals from entering or leaving), and travel or trade restrictions.23 
But with the advent of evidence-based public health and modern medicine, 
societies developed and invested in powerful ways to prevent, detect, respond 
to, and treat disease.  
Now, public health is capable of sophisticated surveillance—meticulous 
tracking and monitoring of infections worldwide. A visit to the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) emergency operations center will 
show that real-time data is tracked on novel infections in every corner of the 
globe.24 Similarly, WHO tracks around 3,000 signals a month; very few ever 
pose a threat—but some do, and will become mass killers.25  
Further, biomedical countermeasures have rendered certain dreaded 
pestilences largely relics of the past. WHO helped to eradicate smallpox in 
1980, and is on the way to doing the same for polio.26 WHO resolution 
WHA66.12 urges Member States to expand and implement the Global Plan to 
Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases, which could signal the end of neglected 
tropical diseases such as Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm), Leishmaniasis, and 
 
 21 Clive Bell & Maureen Lewis, The Economic Implications of Epidemics Old and New 5 (Ctr. for 
Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 54, 2005). 
 22 Jeffrey S. Sartin, Infectious Diseases During the Civil War: The Triumph of the “Third Army,” 16 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 580, 582 (1993). 
 23 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 
416, 424 (3d ed. 2016). 
 24 See Emergency Operations Centers: CDC Emergency Operations Center (EOC), CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/eoc.htm (last updated Sept. 1, 2016). 
 25 See Health Emergencies Represent Some of the Greatest Risks to the Global Economy and Security, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 8, 2017), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2017/g20-summit/en/. 
 26 Smallpox, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/en/ (last visited June 30, 
2017); see Poliomyelitis, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/ (last 
visited June 30, 2017). 
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Human African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).27 Through 
pharmaceuticals and vaccinations, dangerous diseases like yellow fever and 
malaria can be prevented and treated. Scientists quickly brought to market an 
effective vaccine for influenza A(H1N1) during the 2009 pandemic, and are 
now developing a Zika vaccine28 in the aftermath of the 2016–2017 epidemic 
in the Americas. 
Additionally, new therapeutic agents and technologies allow scientists to 
ever more rapidly identify pathogens’ weaknesses and develop medical 
countermeasures. New methods, such as the gene editing system “Clustered 
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats” (CRISPR), hold great 
promise for developing vaccines and treatments, as do innovative methods of 
stemming disease vectors, such as reducing mosquito populations.29  
Despite these gains, the global hazard level may be greater than ever 
before. Since the 1980s, successive emerging infectious diseases have 
reminded the international community that infectious diseases continue to 
cause devastating harms. Indeed, the HIV/AIDS epidemic shattered the myth 
that infectious diseases were a concern of the past.30 By the mid-1990s, 
HIV/AIDS was a leading cause of death in the United States in people aged 
twenty-five to forty-four,31 and was spreading out of control in sub-Saharan 
Africa.32 Since the beginning of the epidemic, more than 70 million people 
 
 27 World Health Assembly, Neglected Tropical Diseases, at 2, WHA66.12 (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/mediacentre/WHA_66.12_Eng.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL 
PLAN TO COMBAT NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 2008–2015 2–3 (2007) (urging Member States to expand 
and implement the Global Plan to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases 2008–2015 which identifies priority 
diseases including those listed in the text above).  
 28 See Vaccines for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ 
swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/vaccine_preparedness/en/ (last visited June 30, 2017); Zika Virus 
Vaccines, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/zika-
vaccines (last visited June 30, 2017). 
 29 See Valentino M. Gantz et al., Highly Efficient Cas9-Mediated Gene Drive for Population 
Modification of the Malaria Vector Mosquito Anopheles Stephensi, 112 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. USA E6736, 
E6742 (2015); Liang et al., A CRISPR/Cas9 and Cre/Lox System-Based Express Vaccine Development 
Strategy Against Re-Emerging Pseudorabies Virus, SCI. REP., Jan. 18, 2016, at 1, 1; see also Michael Le Page, 
Boom in Human Gene Editing as 20 CRISPR Trials Gear Up, NEW SCIENTIST (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
2133095-boom-in-human-gene-editing-as-20-crispr-trials-gear-up/. 
 30 Daniel M. Fox, AIDS and the American Health Polity: The History and Prospects of a Crisis of 
Authority, MILBANK Q., 2005, at 1, 2–3. 
 31 See A Timeline of HIV and AIDS, HIV.GOV, https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/history/hiv-
and-aids-timeline (last visited June 30, 2017). 
 32 See SOULEYMANE MBOUP ET AL., DISEASE AND MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Dean T. 
Jamison et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
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have been infected and about 35 million people have died.33 Globally, 
36.7 million people were living with HIV in 2016.34 
Recent disease outbreaks, such as SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009, and the 
ongoing Zika epidemic, have been less devastating in terms of scale, but 
continue to expose global under-preparedness.35 The West African Ebola 
epidemic caused over 11,000 deaths36 in three of the world’s poorest 
countries.37 Future threats loom that could break out at any time, such as the 
SARS-like coronavirus that erupted in Saudi Arabia and South Korea 
(MERS),38 or highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9), currently 
circulating in China.39 Accordingly, biomedical developments must not lull the 
international community into a state of complacency, feeling—wrongly—
invincible from pathogens. 
A. Drivers of Disease 
Patterns and trends of modern life counter momentous scientific advances. 
While globalization and economic development bring enormous social 
benefits, there are also hidden costs: hyper-crowded cities, rapid air travel, 
mass migrations, and intense human–animal interchange alter how pathogens 
emerge and colonize, thus amplifying the risk and severity of outbreaks. 
Conflict zones unravel health systems and spur exoduses. Expanding human 
populations into new geographic areas, climate change, deforestation, intensive 
 
 33 Fact Sheet–Latest Statistics on the Status of the AIDS Epidemic, UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/ 
resources/fact-sheet (last visited June 30, 2017). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Robert Roos, CDC Estimate of Global H1N1 Pandemic Deaths: 284,000, U. MINN. CTR. FOR 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (June 27, 2012), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-
perspective/2012/06/cdc-estimate-global-h1n1-pandemic-deaths-284000 (noting that the CDC estimates 
284,000 deaths attributed to 2009 A(H1N1)); Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 
November 2002 to 31 July 2003, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (attributing 774 deaths to 
SARS between November 1, 2002 and July 31, 2003); Michael McCarthy, Microcephaly Risk with Zika 
Infection Is 1-13% in First Trimester, Study Shows, BMJ (May 31, 2016), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i3048. 
 36 See Ebola Outbreak 2014-2015, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/ 
(last visited June 30, 2017) (listing 11,310 deaths from Ebola from 2014–2015). 
 37 See U.N. List of Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-
Countries.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (listing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the thirty-five least 
developed countries). 
 38 See Agence France-Presse, South Korea: Mers Virus Outbreak Is Over, GUARDIAN (Jul. 27, 2015, 
10:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/south-korea-mers-virus-outbreak-is-over. 
 39 Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm (last updated August 28, 2017). 
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farming, and food production shift the web of interactions between humans, 
animals, and the planet, as never before.  
1. Rising Populations, Megacities, and the Loss of Natural Habitats 
A major feature of human civilization is an ever-increasing population 
migrating en masse to cities. In 2007, for the first time in history, more of the 
world’s population lived in urban areas than rural.40 Africa and Asia are 
urbanizing faster than any region and are expected to be 56% and 64% urban, 
respectively, by 2050.41 By 2050, the world’s population is estimated to rise to 
9.7 billion.42 
In crowded cities, dense populations of humans and animals often live in 
close proximity, fueling transmission of novel viruses from animals to humans, 
and then human to human. Natural habitats are lost through deforestation and 
extractive industries, like logging or mining, to ensure that vast populations 
have food, potable water, and abundant energy.43 Dams, irrigation, and 
deforestation increase vector-borne diseases such as malaria and Rift Valley 
fever.44 Backyard chicken flocks, wet (live animal) markets, and intense 
animal husbandry of poultry, pigs, and cows create troubling risks of zoonotic 
leaps to humans, such as avian influenzas and foot-and-mouth disease.45 As 
domesticated animals infect wild birds (and vice versa), microbes travel on 
avian transcontinental migration routes.46 The threat from zoonotic diseases 
cannot be overstated, constituting the majority (approximately 75%) of new or 
emerging infectious diseases.47 
 
 40 See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 7 (2014); see 
also World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF. 
(July 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html. 
 41 UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., supra note 40, at 1.  
 42 World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, supra note 40. 
 43 Deforestation, WILDSCREEN ARKIVE, http://www.arkive.org/c/deforestation (last visited June 30, 
2017). 
 44 Samuel S. Myers et al., Human Health Impacts of Ecosystem Alteration, 110 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. 
SCI. USA 18753, 18754 (2013). 
 45 See Jun Yuan et al., Effect of Live Poultry Market Closure on Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus Activity 
in Guangzhou, China, 2014, 21 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1784 (2015) (documenting the effect of live 
poultry market closures on A(H7N9) virus detection and viability in Guangzhou, China); Tjeerd Kimman et 
al., Assessing and Controlling Health Risks from Animal Husbandry, NJAS–WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCI., July 3, 
2013, at 7, 8. 
 46 See Kurt D. Reed et al., Birds, Migration and Emerging Zoonoses: West Nile Virus, Lyme Disease, 
Influenza A and Enteropathogens, 1 CLINICAL MED. RES. 5, 8 (2003). 
 47 See Zoonotic Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
onehealth/basics/zoonotic-diseases.html (last visited June 30, 2017). 
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While there is no single cause of a zoonotic leap, these factors can combine 
to create a perfect storm for outbreaks, such as the Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa. The rise in Ebola outbreaks since 1994 is associated with drastic 
changes in forest ecosystems in tropical Africa; indeed, the combination of 
“extensive deforestation and human activities in the depth of the forests may 
have promoted direct or indirect contact between humans and a natural 
reservoir of the virus.”48 The “index” case of the West African epidemic was 
most likely a young boy having eaten bush meat (like a fruit bat)—a pestilence 
literally emerging from the jungle.49  
2. Rapid Travel and Trade 
Globalization propels travel and trade, allowing microbes to span the globe 
at greater speed. Through globalized trade, infected animals transmit zoonotic 
diseases to new reaches. In 2001, diseased animals spread foot-and-mouth 
disease from the United Kingdom to Ireland and the Netherlands,50 resulting in 
millions in economic losses. Likewise, affordable air travel has exploded in 
recent decades, meaning that a pathogen can rapidly span the globe through an 
unsuspecting host.51 It is possible to reach any corner of the world within 
twenty-four hours,52 and passengers may harbor infectious diseases and 
transport disease vectors.53 And the world is undergoing an historic migrant 
crisis as refugees and asylum-seekers flood across borders from conflict zones.  
Consider this: from 2015 to 2018, the CDC recorded 5,372 travel-related 
cases of Zika, compared to 228 locally transmitted cases.54 In May 2015, a 
man returning from travel in the Middle East introduced MERS to South 
 
 48 See J.J. Muyembe-Tamfum et al., Ebola Virus Outbreaks in Africa: Past and Present, 79 
ONDERSTEPOORT J. VETERINARY RES., no. 2, 2013, at 1, 3 (2012). 
 49 See Dennis Lynch, Ebola Patient Zero: Emile Ouamouno of Guinea First to Contract Disease, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ebola-patient-zero-emile-ouamouno-guinea-
first-contract-disease-1714698. 
 50 Patrick J. O’Reilly et al., Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Ireland; History, Diagnosis, Eradication, and 
Serosurveillance, in REPORT OF THE SESSION OF THE RESEARCH GROUP OF THE STANDING TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE 46 (2002). 
 51 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 39 (2014) [hereinafter GLOBAL HEALTH LAW]. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Mary E. Wilson, Travel and the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, 1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 39, 41 (1995). 
 54 Zika Cases in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
zika/reporting/case-counts.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2018) (showing that these figures relate to U.S. states; 
U.S. territories recorded 37,165 symptomatic Zika virus cases, with only 147 of them in travelers returning 
from affected areas). 
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Korea, leading to three-dozen deaths.55 In April 2009, Mexico and the United 
States reported the first confirmed cases of swine influenza (A/H1N1) to the 
WHO.56 On June 11, Dr. Margaret Chan declared the start of the 2009 
influenza pandemic, with seventy-four countries reporting 28,744 cases.57 Nine 
weeks after the first reported case, every WHO region reported cases of 
H1N1.58 Mass travel will continue to rapidly propel disease, underlying the 
need to enhance global health security. 
3. Climate Change  
Historic changes in climate and the environment can unleash pathogenic 
risks that could devastate the world. Increased rainfalls multiply mosquito-
breeding sites, which is especially problematic in areas with inadequate 
sanitation systems.59 Global warming expands the geographic range of disease 
vectors, notably mosquitoes, and enables them and the diseases they carry to 
spread to new regions, subjecting previously unexposed populations to 
infections, such as chikungunya, dengue, and Zika.60 Warmer temperatures 
also affect the lifecycles of certain pathogens. Waterborne diseases, such as 
cholera, become harder to fight with rising temperatures and flooding.61 
Yemen, which has been decimated by war and famine, is now facing the worst 
 
 55 K.H. Kim et al., Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-Cov) Outbreak in South 
Korea, 2015: Epidemiology, Characteristics and Public Health Implication, J. HOSP. INFECTION, Feb. 2017 
207, at 207.  
 56 GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 39; see Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in Two 
Children–Southern California, March-April 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 400 (2009) 
(stating that two laboratory-confirmed cases were reported in California). 
 57 Influenza A(H1N1)–Update 47, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 11, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/don/ 
2009_06_11/en/; Dr. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Statement to the Press (June 11, 2009), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/en/.  
 58 GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 39. For a step-by-step progression of the pandemic, see The 
2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009–April 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (last updated June 16, 2017). 
 59 See Linda Marsa, Hot Zone—A Warming Planet’s Rising Tide of Disaster, DISCOVER (Feb. 4, 2011), 
http://discovermagazine.com/2010/dec/04-hot-zone-warming-planets-rising-tide-of-disaster. 
 60 See Climate Risk and Spread of Vector-Borne Diseases, CLIMATE NEXUS, http://climatenexus.org/ 
learn/public-health-impacts/climate-change-and-vector-borne-diseases (last visited June 30, 2017). 
 61 See Climate Change and Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/globalchange/ 
summary/en/index4.html (last visited June 30, 2017). 
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cholera outbreak in the world.62 U.N. relief workers brought cholera to Haiti in 
2010, and the nation is still in the grips of an unrelenting epidemic.63 
Arctic thawing from climate change could release long-dormant bacteria 
and viruses, for which humans have no immunity, that have been trapped in ice 
and permafrost for millennia.64 In August 2016, in the Yamal Peninsula within 
the Arctic Circle, a twelve-year-old boy died and twenty people were 
hospitalized after being infected by anthrax.65 A historic heat wave that 
summer thawed a long-dead reindeer infected with anthrax bacteria.66 
4. Fragile States and Violent Conflict  
Civil strife—such as the Syrian civil war, political conflict in Libya, or 
bombing in Yemen—weakens populations’ defenses, while further fueling 
mass migrations. The world is experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis since 
World War II, with 20 million people facing starvation and famine in 
northeastern Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.67 Where states 
collapse or cannot govern, basic public health protections are decimated, 
sanitation systems cease to operate, immunization programs are disrupted, and 
health systems erode.68 As a result, diseases like wild polio can re-emerge in 
unstable countries, such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria.69  
Mass movement of families fleeing violence transports diseases across 
borders, while refugee camps congregate people closely in unhygienic 
 
 62 Sarah Toy, Yemen Faces Worst Cholera Outbreak in the World, Health Authorities Say, USA TODAY 
(June 28, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/06/28/yemen-facing-worst-cholera-
outbreak-world-health-authorities-say/436858001/. 
 63 See Rick Gladstone, U.N. Brought Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nations-
peacekeepers-yemen.html. 
 64 See Jasmin Fox-Skelly, There Are Diseases Hidden in Ice, and They Are Waking Up, BBC (May 4, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170504-there-are-diseases-hidden-in-ice-and-they-are-waking-up. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Associated Press, World Faces Worst Humanitarian Crisis Since 1945, Says UN Official, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 10, 2017, 9:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/world-faces-worst-humanitarian-
crisis-since-1945-says-un-official. 
 68 See ENRICO PAVIGNANI & SANDRO COLOMBO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., ANALYSING DISRUPTED 
HEALTH SECTORS: A MODULAR MANUAL 208 (2009); see also TONY VAUX & EMMA VISMAN, CTR. FOR INT’L 
CO-OPERATION & SEC., DEP’T OF PEACE STUDIES, UNIV. OF BRADFORD, SERVICE DELIVERY IN COUNTRIES 
EMERGING FROM CONFLICT 67–73 (2005) (discussing how conflict negatively impacted the Ugandan health 
system). 
 69 See Luma Akil & H. Anwar Ahmad, The Recent Outbreaks and Reemergence of Poliovirus in War 
and Conflict-Affected Areas, 49 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 40, 41 (2016). 
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conditions.70 As vulnerable mass populations flee areas of conflict, drought, or 
flood, they may bring microbes with them.71 As temperatures change, 
disturbances in food production can create famines, forcing people to flee in 
search of food.72 Hungry people may destroy forests and other natural habitats 
to grow their crops.73  
The West African Ebola epidemic revealed another truth—the public 
health gains discussed above are inequitably distributed. Global inequalities of 
wealth and scientific resources critically undermine epidemic preparedness. 
Despite improvements, around 400 million people lack access to one of the 
following: clean water, adequate sanitation, or resilient health systems.74 Even 
if vaccines or medicines are available in high-income countries, low- and 
middle-income states often lack access.75 While lower-income countries bear 
disproportionate risks, every country is vulnerable as infectious diseases 
rapidly spread from country to country, region to region, and worldwide. All 
nations—whether rich or poor—face common vulnerabilities.  
5. Antimicrobial Resistance  
Many scientists view antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and antibacterial 
resistance (ABR) as some of the most significant threats facing the world.76 
Once treatable infections (e.g., hospital-acquired Staphylococcus aureus, 
malaria, and tuberculosis) become resistant to all known treatments, treatments 
will harken back to the days before the advent of antibiotic and antiviral 
medications.77 Today, the world’s most disadvantaged people face the highest 
burden from hard-to-treat infections. A couple hundred thousand people die 
 
 70 See S.J. Cutler, Refugee Crisis and Re-emergence of Forgotten Infections in Europe, 22 CLINICAL 
MICROBIOLOGY INFECTION 8–9 (2015); see also Christos Louis, Médecins Sans Frontières and the Refugee 
Crisis in Greece: An Interview with Dr. Apostolos Veizis, 110 PATHOGENS GLOBAL HEALTH 219–22 (2016). 
 71 See Climate Change and Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/globalchange/ 
summary/en/index4.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); Humanitarian Health Action: Flooding and 
Communicable Diseases Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/flood_ 
cds/en/ (last visited June 30, 2017);. 
 72 See Somini Sengupta, Heat, Hunger and War Force Africans onto a “Road on Fire,” N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/15/world/africa/agadez-climate-change.html. 
 73 See LAUREN BENNETT, CLIMATE INST., DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2017). 
 74 See New Report Shows that 400 Million Do Not Have Access to Essential Health Services, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (June 12, 2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/uhc-report/en/. 
 75 See BERYL LEACH ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT: INCREASING ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 24 (2005). 
 76 See generally ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: GLOBAL REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE 2014, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2014), http://www.who.int/drugresistance/documents/surveillancereport/en/. 
 77 See At UN, Global Leaders Commit to Act on Antimicrobial Resistance, U.N. NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016), 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55011#.V-QoiRNVhBc. 
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every year of drug-resistant tuberculosis,78 which is perhaps humankind’s 
oldest microbial nemesis. By 2050, the regions most at risk for drug-resistant 
infections will include sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Indian 
subcontinent; and globally, deaths from AMR could climb to 10 million every 
year.79 AMR plagues even the richest countries and world-class health 
facilities, as seen in the 2011 outbreak of multi-drug resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae bacteria at the National Institutes of Health, causing six deaths.80  
But the proliferation of AMR and ABR organisms is avoidable; it has 
arisen as a result of discrete and destructive ways in which we have developed, 
or not, our health systems and farms—prophylactic antibiotic use in farmed 
animals, indiscriminate medical prescribing, and poor hospital infection 
control.81 The vast global networks in the manufacture and sale of substandard 
or falsified medications pose another major risk to the integrity and 
effectiveness of antimicrobials.82 Global health experts estimate that the illicit 
sale of substandard and falsified medicines is as great, if not much greater, than 
trafficking of illicit drugs such as cocaine.83 Falsified and substandard 
medications often contain sub-therapeutic doses of a drug’s active ingredient.84 
When patients buy these drugs unknowingly in a street market or on the 
internet, ineffective dosages enable microbes to become resistant.85 In short, it 
is the behavior of human beings that enable superbugs to thrive.  
 
 78 See REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, TACKLING DRUG-RESISTANT INFECTIONS: FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2016). 
 79 See REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: TACKLING A CRISIS FOR 
THE HEALTH AND WEALTH OF NATIONS 5, 9 (2014); see Fergus Walsh, Superbugs to Kill “More Than 
Cancer” by 2050, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-30416844. 
 80 See NIH Uses Genome Sequencing to Help Quell Bacterial Outbreak in Clinical Center, NAT’L 
INSTS. HEALTH (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-uses-genome-
sequencing-help-quell-bacterial-outbreak-clinical-center. 
 81 James A. Ayukekbong et al., The Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance in Developing Countries: 
Causes and Control Strategies, ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE & INFECTION CONTROL 2 (May 15, 2017), 
https://aricjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13756-017-0208-x?site=aricjournal.biomedcentral. 
com. 
 82 See id.; see also Antibiotic Resistance from the Farm to the Table, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/challenges/from-farm-to-table.html (last visited March 1, 2017). 
 83 See COUNTERING THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED AND SUBSTANDARD DRUGS 72–73 (Gillian J. Buckley 
& Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2013). 
 84 Id. at 3. 
 85 See THE EVOLVING THREAT OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: OPTIONS FOR ACTION, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] 39 (2012). 
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6. Ethnocentric Nationalistic Politics  
It is axiomatic that infectious diseases do not respect borders. Global heath 
preparedness is not a national project, but a global responsibility. Yet, populist 
politicians rail against the very values needed for global health preparedness: 
international cooperation, strong global institutions, and mutual solidarity.86 
Populist leaders are more likely to be inward-looking and less likely to provide 
robust technical and financial assistance to poorer countries. Instead, hyper-
nationalists erect walls, literally and figuratively, putting country “first,” ahead 
of the world’s population and the planet we inhabit. They renege on promises 
of humanitarian assistance87 and global climate change solidarity; they 
undermine international organizations; and they blame “the other.” 
The United States is experiencing a pronounced shift to ethno-nationalism. 
In 2003, President George W. Bush created the President’s Emergency 
Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the largest global health program for a 
single disease in history.88 In 2017, President Donald Trump proposed to cut 
funding for vital public health agencies, such as the CDC89 and the National 
Institutes of Health, while eliminating the Fogarty International Center, which 
builds health capacities in low- and middle-income countries.90  
These pivots away from mutual solidarity are dangerous for global health. 
Cooperative action, moreover, is in every country’s national interest. Health 
security in high-income states becomes imperiled when poorer countries lack 
basic health infrastructures. No legal or physical barrier can impede the spread 
of a microbe so minute that it cannot be seen. Fighting a pathogenic threat 
where it arises is far less expensive and far more effective than waiting until 
the pestilence reaches our shores.  
 
 86 See Miles Kahler, President Trump and the Future of Global Governance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/president-trump-and-future-global-governance. 
 87 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Best Evidence Aside: Why Trump’s Executive Order Makes America Less 
Healthy, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 5, 5–6. 
 88 See Myra Sessions, Overview of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), CTR. 
FOR GLOB. DEV., https://www.cgdev.org/doc/HIVAIDSMonitor/OverviewPEPFAR.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017); see also About Us, U.S. PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, https://www.pepfar.gov/ 
about/270968.htm (last visited July 11, 2017). 
 89 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations, Appropriations Committee 
Releases the Fiscal Year 2018 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education Funding Bill, (July 12, 2017), 
https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394995. 
 90 See Lawrence Gostin, JAMA Forum: The Fogarty International Center, a National Treasure for 
Global Health, NEWS@JAMA (Apr. 27, 2017), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2017/04/27/jama-forum-the-
fogarty-international-center-a-national-treasure-for-global-health/. 
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B. Underinvesting in Preparedness: The Economic Costs of Epidemics 
Despite wealthy countries’ reluctance to invest in pandemic preparedness, 
infectious diseases are not only a matter of public health, but also a serious 
economic concern. The National Academy of Sciences projects that novel 
infectious diseases will cost the global economy $60 billion per year, 
amounting to $6 trillion per century.91 What makes these data chilling is that 
they are not estimated, but rather expected minimum costs that are virtually 
certain to unfold given historical events. Further, these expected costs are 
direct costs only;92 we argue that they miss the vast impact of epidemics on 
global trade, travel, tourism, and worker productivity, which are harder to 
accurately estimate; and the toll on families and communities that can unravel 
social support networks. 
Other economic models predict much higher costs. The World Bank 
estimates potential losses from a severe influenza pandemic—a once-or-twice-
per-century event—at $3 trillion in global direct and indirect losses or 4.8% of 
global GDP.93 The National Bureau of Economic Research estimates a figure 
of $490 billion that includes mortality costs.94 A further approximation 
suggests that the added annual global cost of moderate-severe to severe 
pandemics is roughly $570 billion, or 0.7% of global income.95 In the United 
States alone, the CDC reports that international trade with countries that are at 
high risk of outbreaks (referred to as “first and second order” threat countries) 
represents $308 billion annually, accounting for 1.6 million U.S. jobs.96 Major 
infectious disease events would imperil all this economic activity, and 
probably more. 
Although economic modeling is inexact, economic losses are steeped in 
reality. Disease outbreaks have caused massive economic disruption. The 2003 
 
 91 See Anas El Turabi & Philip Saynisch, Modeling the Economic Threat of Pandemics, in THE 
NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 109, 111. Please note, all dollar figures refer to 
U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified. 
 92 Id. at 113. 
 93 OLGA JONAS, WORLD BANK, PANDEMIC RISK 2 (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/ 
dam/Worldbank/document/HDN/Health/WDR14_bp_Pandemic_Risk_Jonas.pdf; see Pandemic Preparedness 
and Health Systems Strengthening, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/pandemics (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2018). 
 94 See Victoria Y. Fan et al., The Inclusive Cost of Pandemic Influenza Risk, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 22137, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22137. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Cynthia H. Cassell et al., Relevance of Global Health Security to the U.S. Export Economy, 16 
HEALTH SECURITY 563, 567 (2017).  
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SARS outbreak cost East Asia $40 billion;97 annual seasonal influenza costs 
the United States $87 billion;98 and Ebola caused Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone at least $2.2 billion in lost economic growth.99 Global losses due to the 
six major zoonotic disease outbreaks from 1997 through 2009 cost on average 
$6.7 billion per year.100  
At the societal level, catastrophic pandemics like HIV/AIDS dampen 
productivity by removing workers from the workforce and increasing 
absenteeism.101 Children are robbed of their parents, prompting knock-on 
effects on economic growth.102 Often their parents’ condition means they 
cannot access education,103 leading to worse job prospects. Economic activities 
such as farming are disrupted, affecting workers and food security; access to 
vital services like health care is impacted, meaning that chronic conditions go 
untreated and increase in severity.104 In fact, illnesses and deaths from 
preventable causes (e.g., cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and complications of 
child birth) may have affected more people than Ebola itself during the 
epidemic in West Africa, as people avoided health facilities, while some health 
centers closed.105 
The costs are amplified by fear that prompts individuals, companies, and 
governments to overreact and alter their behavior.106 As Tedros Adhanom 
 
 97 Jong-Wha Lee & Warwick J. McKibbin, Estimating the Global Economic Costs of SARS, in 
LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY 92, 103 
(Knobler et al. eds., 2004). 
 98 Noelle-Angelique Molinari et al., The Annual Impact of Seasonal Influenza in the US: Measuring 
Disease Burden and Costs, 25 VACCINE 5086, 5092 (Oct. 2007). 
 99 See World Bank Group Ebola Response Fact Sheet, WORLD BANK (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/brief/world-bank-group-ebola-fact-sheet. See generally JONAS, 
supra note 93. 
 100 See WORLD BANK, 2 PEOPLE, PATHOGENS AND OUR PLANET: THE ECONOMICS OF ONE HEALTH xii 
(2012). 
 101 Kazeem O. Okosun et al., Analysis of Recruitment and Industrial Human Resources Management for 
Optimal Productivity in the Presence of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 39 J. BIOLOGICAL PHYSICS 99–121 (2013); 
see also Matthew P. Fox et al., The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Labour Productivity in Kenya, 9 TROPICAL MED. 
& INT’L HEALTH 318–24 (2004); Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least 
Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331 (2008). 
 102 See Epidemics and Economics, ECONOMIST (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
1698814. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Ebola and Other Disease Outbreaks: Implications for Economic Growth and Trade, U.S. 
AGENCY INT’L DEV. (July 2015), https://www.msh.org/sites/msh.org/files/agoa_brief_final.pdf. 
 105 See Kim J. Brolin Ribacke et al., Effects of the West Africa Ebola Virus Disease on Health-Care 
Utilization–A Systematic Review, 4 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Oct. 10, 2016, at 1, 2. 
 106 See Sulzhan Bali et al., Long Shadow of Fear in an Epidemic: Fearonomic Effects of Ebola on the 
Private Sector in Nigeria, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 11 (2016). 
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Ghebreyesus, the current WHO Director General, recently put it—when an 
outbreak hits, there are two epidemics—“one caused by the virus, and the other 
one caused by fear.”107 For instance, while SARS claimed fewer than 800 
lives, its economic costs are estimated at $40 billion.108 Tourism often suffers 
as vacationers seek to avert ill health by traveling elsewhere. During the SARS 
outbreak, hoteliers in Hong Kong experienced record-low bookings, driven by 
fear of contracting the disease.109 The MERS outbreak in South Korea led to a 
20% fall in tourism in 2015,110 while in Sierra Leone, hotel occupancy plunged 
from 70% to 13% in one year during the Ebola outbreak.111  
Fear of disease also leads consumers to avoid retail stores, sports and 
music events, and cinemas. Although trade often moves online, outbreaks 
primarily affect local, small sellers.112 Beyond human behavior are the actions 
of governments themselves—along with the private sector—that overreact 
through quarantines and travel bans.113 Even rational government action can 
take an economic toll; the mass culling of chickens to prevent the spread of 
avian influenza deprives individuals of private property, and farmers may be 
under-compensated for lost livestock.114 
Overall, we see an all-too familiar pattern repeated in historical cycles: 
under-preparedness in times of calm, juxtaposed with frenetic activity and calls 
for action in times of crisis, followed by a return to complacency. Albert 
Camus described this phenomenon in fiction mirroring reality:  
Everybody knows that pestilences have a way of recurring in the 
world; yet somehow we find it hard to believe in ones that crash 
down on our heads from a blue sky. There have been as many 
 
 107 Health Emergencies Represent Some of the Greatest Risks to the Global Economy and Security, 
supra note 25. 
 108 Robert F. Breiman et al., Role of China in the Quest to Define and Control SARS, in LEARNING FROM 
SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 97, at 56, 57; 
LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK–WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 
97, at 12. 
 109 See Grace C.L. Chien & Rob Law, The Impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Hotels, 
22 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 327–32 (2003). 
 110 See Iain Marlow, What’s the Economic Impact of the MERS Outbreak in South Korea?, GLOBE & 
MAIL (June 18, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/whats-the-economic-impact-
of-the-mers-outbreak-in-south-korea/article25031999/. 
 111 See Ebola and Other Disease Outbreaks, supra note 104. 
 112 See Bali et al., supra note 106. 
 113 See infra Section II.C.5. 
 114 See J.A. Backer et al., Controlling Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks: An 
Epidemiological and Economic Model Analysis, 121 PREVENTATIVE VETERINARY MED. 142–50 (2015). 
GOSTIN GALLEYPROOFS2 3/30/2018 9:22 AM 
356 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:337 
plagues as wars in history; yet always plagues and wars take 
people equally by surprise.115 
II. A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 
Having identified the major social, economic, and political challenges 
impeding preparedness, we now turn to a blueprint for a more secure world. 
First, we examine the economic investment needed to create a more secure 
world. 
A. The Peace Dividend 
In response to the vast direct and indirect economic costs of major 
outbreaks, virtually every expert in global health security has urged sustained 
investments in health systems, research and development, and robust 
international institutions.116 This is not only economically sound, but also 
promises economic benefits. Prevention is far more efficient than response. 
The World Bank estimates that investing in pandemic preparedness for 
zoonotic diseases alone could yield between $11.6 and $26.6 billion in global 
benefit, depending on the severity of the pandemic.117 Further, countries with 
reduced burdens of devastating diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria, have more robust economic growth—a more productive workforce, 
enhanced consumer spending, and fewer demands on health and social 
services.118 
What level of economic investment is required to ramp up preparedness? In 
2012, the Word Bank estimated that $1.9 to $3.4 billion was required to 
upgrade zoonotic disease prevention and control systems in developing 
countries to meet World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO 
standards.119 In 2016, the Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework 
proposed a peace or security dividend—an incremental additional investment 
of $4.5 billion per year for health systems, emergency response, and research; 
 
 115 ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 34 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Alfred A. Knopf, 1957) (1948). 
 116 See, e.g., Phyllida Travis et al., Overcoming Health-Systems Constraints to Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals, 364 LANCET 900–06 (2004); Dongbao Yu et al., Investment in HIV/AIDS Programs: 
Does It Help Strengthen Health Systems in Developing Countries?, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 8 (Sept. 16, 
2008), https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-4-8. 
 117 WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at 23. 
 118 See John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria, in THE INTOLERABLE 
BURDEN OF MALARIA 85, 94 (Joel G. Breman et al. eds., 2001). 
 119 See WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at xi. 
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that is, just sixty-five cents per person per annum would buy the world far 
greater security.120  
Table I: “Annual Expected Rate of Return on Investments in Prevention”121 
 
 Disease Outbreaks Prevented 
Mild Pandemic Severe Pandemic 
Low 
Preventive 
Effort 
High 
Preventi
ve Effort 
Low 
Preventiv
e Effort 
High 
Preventi
ve Effort 
Reduction in 
expected 
disease 
outbreak 
impact 
20% 31% 14% 49% 25% 
50% 65% 44% 88% 57% 
100% 97% 71% 123% 86% 
More broadly, the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
determined that high-income countries should allocate 0.1% of gross national 
income (GNI) to official development assistance (ODA) for health.122 Yet, in 
2009, ODA for health from wealthier countries was 0.048% of GNI, half of 
what is required by this measure.123 The majority of this spending was not for 
strengthening health systems, but rather for targeting specific diseases such as 
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and polio. A small fraction of global health 
assistance goes to developing capabilities for surveillance and rapid response 
to emerging diseases.124 
The same is true of in-country spending. In April 2001—in Abuja, 
Nigeria—African Union countries pledged to allocate at least 15% of their 
annual budget to the health sector and urged donor countries to scale up 
support.125 A decade later, only two countries have reached this target, and 
seven countries actually decreased their health sector expenditures.126 Current 
donor spending varies dramatically.127 
 
 120 THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2, at 82. 
 121 WORLD BANK, supra note 100, at 23. 
 122 See COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN 
HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12 (2001). 
 123 See OECD, STATISTICS ON RESOURCE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2011). 
 124 OECD, MEASURING AID 50 YEARS OF DAC STATISTICS – 1961–2011 13 (2011). 
 125 See THE ABUJA DECLARATION: TEN YEARS ON, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1–2 (2011). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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If preparedness offers such good economic yields and the devastation 
caused is on par with, or far exceeds, other disasters—chemical, nuclear, or 
natural—why do countries fail to ensure health security? The West African 
Ebola outbreak will certainly yield a new tranche in preparedness, particularly 
WHO reform. In 2014, the Gates Foundation committed more than $500 
million toward research and development “to stay ahead of emerging disease 
threats.”128 Yet, previous outbreaks such as SARS and H1N1 also led to 
similar calls that were never sustained.129 Why is it that countries fail to meet 
financing targets and respect international norms? The World Bank suggests 
the answers include complexity of the task, the limited perceived returns, and 
competing demands as key determinants.130 Political leaders seek demonstrable 
short term “wins”—sustainable systems for shoring up defenses in the long 
term seems outside their political attention span. Instead, governments need to 
understand and act on the clear economic and human dividends of investing in 
preparedness. 
B. Strong International Institutions with National Commitment to Global 
Norms 
Leadership from well-functioning global institutions forms the apex of 
global health security. Infectious diseases rapidly transcend borders, requiring 
strong international institutions to set norms and coordinate action.131 
International institutions can develop the global standards, offer the technical 
assistance, and mobilize the resources to prevent, detect, and respond to 
outbreaks. U.N. institutions in particular have the legitimacy to promote cross-
border cooperation, information sharing, and compliance with international 
rules. Investing in institutions will produce dividends for population health and 
human security. 
Yet, trust in international institutions crumbled in the aftermath of the West 
African Ebola epidemic. U.N. institutions proved to be utterly underprepared 
and underfunded, unable to mount a swift response.132 The leading global 
 
 128 See Gates Foundation Commits More than $500 Million to Tackle the Burden of Infectious Disease 
in Developing Countries, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ 
Media-Center/Press-Releases/2014/11/ASTMH-Address. 
 129 See Harvey V. Fineberg, Pandemic Preparedness and Response—Lessons from the H1N1 Influenza 
of 2009, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED 1335, 1335 (2014). 
 130 See INT’L WORKING GRP. ON FIN. PREPAREDNESS, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 131 David P. Fidler, Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 180, 
181–82 (2015). 
 132 See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Toward a Common Secure Future: Four Global 
Commissions in the Wake of Ebola, 13 PLOS MED., May 19, 2016, at 1. 
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health institution—WHO—exhibited marked dysfunction as headquarters in 
Geneva could not coordinate effectively with WHO’s Regional Office for 
Africa (AFRO) and country offices.133 Member States’ neglect of global 
preparedness and WHO’s weaknesses were starkly highlighted with the deep 
structural problems underlying the Organization becoming center stage. The 
WHO Director-General at the time, Margaret Chan,134 appeared unresponsive 
to desperate calls for help from the region, waiting more than four months after 
international spread to declare a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern, even after Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) implored her to act.135 
The West African Ebola epidemic spurred major WHO reforms, but it is 
too early to know whether they will be adequate. Thus far, dynamic new 
structures are in place, such as an Emergency Response Program and a 
contingency emergency fund (discussed below), but both remain badly 
underfunded.136 Meanwhile, the world continues to spring from complacency 
to panic without building the long-term sustainability needed for a more secure 
world. In short, we remain vulnerable to the next pandemic. 
Instead, robust institutions require leadership, transparency, inclusive 
participation (civil society and stakeholder engagement), and accountability—
abiding by the rule of law.137 Institutions, moreover, must lead by setting 
authoritative norms, building robust health system capacities, and influencing 
outcomes. Institutions that govern well will be more politically persuasive and 
gain international legitimacy and public trust. Good governance will preserve 
human rights, advance equity, curtail corruption, and ensure transparency and 
accountability. Member States, moreover, must act as stakeholders invested in 
the success of global institutions, while institutional leaders should act boldly 
and competently. Although these benchmarks of good governance are 
applicable to all institutions, we focus on WHO, along with the World Bank, 
which launched new initiatives after the West African Ebola outbreak. 
 
 133 See generally Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis of 
the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health Systems at the Foundation and an 
Empowered WHO at the Apex, 385 LANCET 1902 (2015). 
 134 Former Director-General: Dr. Margaret Chan, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/dg/chan/ 
en/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 135 Gostin & Friedman, supra note 133, at 1902. 
 136 See infra Section II.D.1. 
 137 See generally CHELSEA CLINTON & DEVI SRIDHAR, GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH: WHO RUNS THE 
WORLD AND WHY? (2017). 
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C. Enhanced Security Through the World Health Organization  
No other institution has the legitimacy, partnerships, ties with health 
ministries, or normative authority that WHO has. Established as the first U.N. 
specialized agency in 1948, its 194 Member States each have an equal vote in 
the World Health Assembly.138 Its constitution mandates WHO “to act as the 
directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work,”139 working 
collaboratively with U.N. organs, specialized agencies, and governments. The 
constitution directs WHO “to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in 
emergencies, necessary aid.”140 In light of this unique mandate, WHO leads the 
U.N. Global Health Cluster, which coordinates forty-eight Health Cluster 
partners (U.N. and non-U.N.) at the global level and over 300 country 
partners.141 
Despite its powerful mandate, the record of WHO in leading the global 
response to infectious diseases has been mixed. Its signal achievement was to 
eradicate smallpox in 1980,142 but it has not had as much success with other 
eradication campaigns, such as malaria.143 Over time, the position of the 
Organization as the guardian of global public health began to erode, sidelined 
in fundamental ways by the World Bank, UNAIDS, the Global Fund, and large 
donors such as the Gates Foundation. By the turn of the century, high-income 
states lost confidence in the Organization.144 Marred by accusations of 
corruption and cronyism, States steadfastly refused to increase the WHO 
budget, and mostly earmarked funds for their own preferred projects through 
public–private partnerships that were viewed as more nimble and efficient, 
such as the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance.145  
In the wake of the West African Ebola outbreak, many of WHO’s most 
important functions are being monopolized by new public–private 
partnerships. For instance, WHO should set priorities for vaccine development 
and mobilization of resources for research and development. But even this vital 
 
 138 THE GLOBAL GUARDIAN OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2016). 
 139 See Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 2, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See Secretariat, World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Health Workforce 
Coordination in Emergencies with Health Consequences, at 4, WHO Doc. A70/11 (Apr. 13, 2017), http://apps. 
who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA70/A70_11-en.pdf. 
 142 See World Health Org. Res. 33.3, WHA 33/1980/REC/1, at 1 (May 8, 1980). 
 143 See José A. Nájera et al., Some Lessons for the Future from the Global Malaria Eradication 
Programme (1955–1969), 8 PLOS MED., Jan. 2011, at 1, 5. 
 144 GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 130. 
 145 See id. at 129–73. 
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task has shifted to the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
(CEPI).146 
Post-Ebola Global Commissions—by the U.N. Secretary-General, WHO, 
the National Academy of Sciences, and Harvard University/London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine—provide fresh impetus to reform and 
revitalize WHO’s constitutional mandate.147 While WHO has begun the reform 
process, many of its deep-seated structural problems remain: (1) unsustainable 
funding, (2) dysfunction between headquarters and regional offices, 
(3) ineffective stewardship, (4) failure to actively engage civil society, and 
(5) incapacity to ensure compliance with the International Health Regulations 
(IHR). Finally, as discussed in more detail below, WHO’s emergency response 
requires significant reform to avert future health catastrophes. 
1. Unsustainable Funding 
Systemic underfunding brought disastrous consequences for West Africa 
and the world, yet WHO remains inadequately financed to respond to health 
emergencies. WHO is chronically starved of funding, culminating in a budget 
deficit of $300 million in 2010.148 In response, the Organization’s biennial 
budget was cut by $1 billion, 35% of which came from funds dedicated to 
epidemic preparedness and response.149 Currently, only about 20% of the 
budget comes from member states’ mandatory contributions, which is needed 
to ensure long-term, predictable, conflict-free funding that supports its ongoing 
work in line with global health priorities.150  
The rest of WHO’s funding comes from voluntary contributions mostly 
earmarked for the donor’s selected project.151 Although voluntary contributions 
 
 146 See Mission, COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, http://cepi.net/mission (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2018); infra Section II.D.2. 
 147 See Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next 
Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386 
LANCET 2204, 2216 (2015); THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 2; U.N. HIGH-
LEVEL PANEL ON THE GLOB. RESPONSE TO HEALTH CRISES, PROTECTING HUMANITY FROM FUTURE HEALTH 
CRISES ¶¶ 130, 133 (2016) [hereinafter U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL]; REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM 
ASSESSMENT PANEL, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] ¶ 28 (2015) [hereinafter EBOLA INTERIM 
ASSESSMENT PANEL]. 
 148 GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 51, at 90. 
 149 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Security After Ebola: Four Global Commissions, 94 
MILBANK Q. 34 (2016); Devi Sridhar & Lawrence O. Gostin, Reforming the World Health Organization, 305 
JAMA 1585, 1586 (2011). 
 150 Sridhar & Gostin, supra note 149, at 1586. 
 151 Id. 
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have always accounted for part of the budget, discretionary funding has 
comprised the lion’s share since the 1990s.152 This has transformed WHO into 
a donor-driven organization with powerful benefactors—such as the United 
States, the European Union, and the Gates Foundation—heavily influencing 
agenda-setting and priorities. Accordingly, global health priorities are badly 
misaligned with the global burden of disease with funding reserved for specific 
diseases or narrowly perceived national security interests placed high on the 
global health agenda.153  
The current budget is wholly incommensurate with WHO’s worldwide 
mandate. To put it in perspective, WHO’s budget is just over a quarter of the 
CDC’s, and less than the budget of a large hospital.154 WHO’s 2016–2017 
budget was set at $4.39 billion, but was supplemented by $160 million to 
finance the new WHO Health Emergencies Program.155 Its budget for 2018–
2019 of $4.42 billion is actually a decrease in real dollars. 156 This funding 
pattern propagates a vicious cycle: Member States underfund the agency, 
making it hard for WHO to succeed. When the Organization inevitably falls 
short, donors further lose confidence and seek out other institutions for their 
financial largess. This dysfunctional pattern may become more insecure with 
two of its largest donors—the United States and United Kingdom—157 
embroiled in the politics of ethno-nationalism. 
Member States must become genuine shareholders in WHO by raising 
contributions and doubling WHO’s overall budget. Reforms have begun to 
increase WHO control over its budget and adjust financing to priorities.158 In 
2013, World Health Assembly gave itself the power to approve the entire 
budget, rather than only the assessed contributions.159 But WHO must go 
 
 152 Id. (stating that voluntary contributions comprise approximately 80% of the WHO’s budget). 
 153 See Lawrence O. Gostin, A Framework Convention on Global Health: Health for All, Justice for All, 
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 154 See Humanitarian Health Action: Donor Centre, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/hac/ 
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 155 World Health Org. [WHO], 68th World Health Assembly, Proposed Programme Budget 2016-2017, 
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 156 See World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Proposed Programme Budget 2018-
2019, at 5, WHO Doc. A70/7 (Apr. 10, 2017). 
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further. We argue that mandatory dues from Member States should comprise at 
least 50% of the WHO budget—a proposition that is improbable in the age of 
austerity. Perhaps more feasible is that WHO could charge overheads on 
earmarked voluntary contributions of 20% to 30% for flexible voluntary 
contributions to supplement its core budget.160 Still, WHO would risk losing 
donors or driving them toward other multilateral or bilateral organizations that 
do not charge overhead.161 
2. Dysfunction Between Headquarters and Regional Offices 
The decentralized structure of WHO poses further challenges that came to 
the fore during the West African Ebola epidemic. WHO’s six regional offices 
are uniquely independent within the UN system, with full power over regional 
personnel.162 During the outbreak, Director-General Chan and AFRO fought 
over control, perhaps hindering international assistance.163 AFRO did not 
convene health ministers or open a regional coordination center until three 
months after Ebola was confirmed.164 In January 2015, the Director-General 
deflected responsibility, saying that it was the obligation of AFRO to 
respond.165  
To address these challenges, WHO headquarters should exercise greater 
oversight and control over regional personnel and decision making. WHO 
should fully disclose the funds held within each regional office and how 
regions meet health objectives, with monitoring and benchmarks of success. 
Even if decentralized decision making remains the norm, WHO should apply 
the same yardstick across regions to assess efficiency and effectiveness. 
Regional offices can be effective. Member States, for example, generously 
fund the Pan American Health Organization (WHO’s regional office for the 
Americas), which has gained wide respect. During the Zika epidemic, it was 
proactive, taking the lead from WHO headquarters in Geneva.166 
 
 160 Sridhar & Gostin, supra note 149, at 1586. 
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 163 See Somini Sengupta, Effort on Ebola Hurt W.H.O. Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www. 
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 164 Gostin & Friedman, supra note 133, at 1904. 
 165 See Sengupta, supra note 163. 
 166 See WHO and PAHO Initiative to Support 17 New Research Proposals on Zika in Seven Countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, PAHO, http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
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3. Ineffective Stewardship  
WHO operates in a sea of powerful actors; it must reestablish its legitimacy 
as the guardian of global health. Currently, WHO struggles to compete:167 
Global health governance is packed with approximately 200 international 
health institutions, spanning public international organizations (e.g., UNICEF, 
UNAIDS), public–private partnerships (e.g., GAVI, Global Fund, UNITAD, 
and CEPI), and philanthropies (e.g., Gates, Rockefeller, and Ford 
foundations).168 The proliferation of global health actors has yielded new 
funding sources, innovative governance, and civil society engagement. Yet, the 
global landscape is plagued by failures of leadership, accountability, and 
coordination.169 
WHO should influence and coordinate the many institutions and regimes 
that affect and intersect with global health security. Intellectual property, for 
example, can undermine access to essential medicines; trade in services 
impacts health worker migration; and climate change implicates food, disease 
vectors, and natural disasters. The Organization should advocate the 
importance of global health security and how complementary sectors can 
protect human wellbeing. WHO must work closely with the OIE to ensure 
coordination with animal health and harmonized approaches to AMR. It must 
guide the World Trade Organization (WTO) in fulfilling its mission of trade 
liberalization while respecting the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health. In turn, these institutions can shore up their understanding of global 
health and advance health in decisions and norms. For instance, during the 
H1N1 pandemic, the Food and Agriculture Organization, OIE, and WTO 
issued joint statements with WHO, discouraging trade restrictions on pigs or 
pig products.170 Through stewarding international governance, WHO can 
underscore the multifaceted threat posed by outbreaks.  
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4. Failure to Actively Engage Civil Society 
Civil society plays a crucial role in health security. Nongovernmental 
organizations often are the first to identify threats, issue urgent calls to action, 
support sufferers, and hold governments and international organizations to 
account. Often civil society organizations lead the humanitarian response, as 
MSF did during the West African Ebola outbreak.171 Community-based 
organizations understand local cultures and can guide health behaviors from 
within.  
Yet, WHO’s engagement with civil society is limited. Reflecting the 
principle of state sovereignty, non-state actors play no formal role in WHO 
governing structures. This contrasts with newer organizations, like UNAIDS, 
which includes civil society on its governing board, although with non-voting 
status.172 Civil society, businesses, and foundations may be full board members 
of the Global Fund and GAVI Alliance.173 Yet, WHO has devised a 
cumbersome process that inhibits nongovernmental organizations from 
participating in governance meetings. NGOs must gain “official relations” 
status to take part, even in their non-voting capacity.174 WHO rules require 
these organizations to have international membership or scope,175 which often 
excludes domestic, poorly funded, and small NGOs.176 Even NGOs that gain 
official status often struggle to be heard.177 
WHO must make it simpler for stakeholders to participate. The Executive 
Board and Assembly should be open to NGO participation. For example, 
WHO could offer scholarships to developing country NGOs. It could expand 
opportunities for civil society input, such as by allowing extemporaneous 
statements, facilitating NGO side sessions, and conducting open hearings. 
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Going further, to reflect modern governance structures, WHO should include 
civil society as part of its governance structure—even if this would require a 
constitutional amendment. And from the very earliest moments of an outbreak, 
it should work closely with civil society to develop culturally sensitive 
responses. 
5. Incapacity to Ensure Compliance with the IHR  
WHO has unparalleled normative powers. Article 2 of its constitution 
authorizes the World Health Assembly “to propose conventions, agreements 
and regulations, and make recommendations with respect to international 
health matters.”178 Article 19 permits the World Health Assembly to adopt a 
convention by two-thirds vote, while article 20 directs members to “take 
action” by accepting or rejecting the convention or agreement within eighteen 
months after adoption.179 To date, the World Health Assembly has adopted 
only one convention, which has been a powerful force for global health—the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.180 
The Organization’s authority to adopt regulations is even more remarkable. 
By article 22, regulations enter “into force for all Members after due notice has 
been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members 
as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the 
period stated in the notice.”181 Consequently, States must proactively “opt out” 
or they are automatically bound. Perhaps standing alone in international law, 
the Constitution of the WHO permits the imposition of binding obligations 
absent a State’s express assent.  
The IHR is the Organization’s most prominent regulation, standing as the 
governing authority for global health security.182 However, the Organization 
has struggled to secure State compliance with the Regulations. Countries 
continue to clutch sovereignty, often failing to internalize international norms, 
 
 178 See Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 139, at art. 2(k). 
 179 Id. at arts. 19–20. 
 180 See About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
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endangering global health. Developing countries, moreover, lack the financial 
and technical assistance needed to ensure their health system capacities.183  
The 2005 revision of the IHR—in response to SARS—implemented vital 
reforms, including an “all-hazards” strategy (instead of targeting specific 
diseases), early state reporting (articles 6 and 7), use of unofficial (non-State) 
data sources (article 9.1), and development of health-system capacities to 
prevent, detect, and respond to potential public health emergencies of 
international concern (PHEIC) (article 5.1).184 The IHR empowers WHO to 
coordinate stakeholders and make recommendations. Yet, as highlighted by 
recent public health emergencies, weaknesses remain.185 
Under the IHR, WHO’s Director-General has the power to declare a 
PHEIC (article 12.1) and issue temporary recommendations to 196 States 
Parties (article 15).186 The Director-General decides—based on advice from an 
emergency committee, available evidence from the state and extraneous 
sources, scientific principles and evidence, and an assessment of the risk to 
human health—risk of international spread and interference with international 
traffic (article 12.4).187 Since entry into force, the Director-General has 
declared four PHEICs: influenza (H1N1) (2009), polio (2014), Ebola (2014), 
and Zika (together with associated neurological conditions) (2016).188 
Yet, WHO failed to convene an emergency meeting for Ebola or declare a 
public health emergency for four and a half months.189 WHO was also 
criticized during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic when the Organization was accused 
of promoting panic.190 Further, its designation of polio as a PHEIC has 
prompted criticism, given that only a handful of wild polio cases had been 
identified.191 A more flexible governance structure could enable WHO to 
 
 183 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Global Health Law Trilogy: Towards a Safer, Healthier, 
and Fairer World, 390 LANCET 1918 (2017). 
 184 IHR, supra note 182. Article 1 defines a PHEIC as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as 
provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international 
spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.” Id. 
 185 See Gostin et al., supra note 132, at 4. 
 186 See IHR, supra note 182, at art. 12.1, 15. 
 187 Id. at art. 12.4. 
 188 See World Health Org. [WHO], 70th World Health Assembly, Implementation of the International 
Health Regulations (2005): Annual Report on the Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005) Report by the Director-General, at 5, WHO Doc. A70/15 (May 17, 2017). 
 189 See Moon et al., supra note 147. 
 190 See Lena H. Sun et al., Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations Failed to Stop the 
Ebola Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/10/04/how-
ebola-sped-out-of-control/?utm_term=.af2a6cf9cfd2. 
 191 See Lawrence O. Gostin & Rebecca Katz, The International Health Regulations: The Governing 
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mount earlier, event-specific responses. Post-Ebola global commissions 
proposed an intermediate-level emergency declaration and/or a standing 
emergency committee to continuously monitor circulating pathogens of 
concern.192 Enhancing transparency and accountability would improve 
international confidence.  
Further, when outbreaks arise, governments and private actors often 
overreact. While the IHR aim to balance trade (article 2)193 and human rights 
(article 3.1),194 States routinely ignore the Director-General’s 
recommendations in favor of overly punitive, non-evidence based restrictions 
on trade and travel, fearing economic and other harm.195 During the Ebola 
epidemic, over 30% of IHR States Parties disregarded WHO 
recommendations, imposing more restrictive measures than recommended.196 
Under international trade law, States have a right to restrict trade to protect 
human, animal, and plant life or health.197 But lawful restrictions require 
sufficient scientific evidence with a scientific risk assessment. Further, trade-
restricting health measures must be non-discriminatory and the least trade-
restrictive measures possible.198 
Similarly, the IHR require States Parties to promptly notify WHO of events 
that may constitute a PHEIC with an ongoing obligation to inform and respond 
to follow-up requests (article 6.2).199 Yet, States have hesitated to report 
suspected outbreaks, fearing the imposition of travel bans and trade 
restrictions, and resulting loss of tourism. While dispute resolution is available 
(article 56),200 it is subject to parties’ consent, and the Director-General has not 
held States accountable for counterproductive travel and trade restrictions or 
publicly identified uncooperative governments. 
 
Framework for Global Health Security, 94 MILBANK Q. 264, 273 (2016). 
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 195 See Wendy Rhymer & Rick Speare, Countries’ Response to WHO’s Travel Recommendations During 
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Agreement), WORLD TRADE ORG. art. 2.1, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last 
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To enhance compliance, WHO should publicly request States Parties to 
justify additional measures and urge private actors against restrictions. WHO 
should publicize States that impose unnecessary travel and trade restrictions. 
States Parties should consider pursuing dispute mediation through the Director-
General or compulsory arbitration. Successful cases brought by States harmed 
by travel or trade restrictions or human rights violations would be a powerful 
precedent to enhance compliance. Trade restrictions could also be challenged 
through the WTO, as Mexico did during the H1N1 pandemic.201 Yet, WTO 
dispute resolution can drag on for years, meaning economic damage is already 
inflicted.202 Lastly, the World Health Assembly could amend the IHR to raise 
temporary recommendations to a binding status. 
D. Reforming Emergency Response 
WHO must undergo fundamental technical reform if it is to attain its 
rightful position as leader in coordinating global health security. In the wake of 
Ebola, the Organization has developed new responses: (1) the Health 
Emergencies Program, (2) the Contingency Fund for Emergencies, and (3) the 
Global Health Emergency Workforce. Meanwhile, the World Bank established 
the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, the first African Director-General of WHO, has promised a 
robust commitment to epidemic preparedness and response, with WHO acting 
in a leadership role.203 Yet, the new Director-General’s record is mixed—he 
served as health minister of Ethiopia, a country with a dismal human rights 
record, and during his post, Ethiopia was accused of covering up a cholera 
epidemic.204 
1. WHO Health Emergencies Program 
In March 2016, drawing on recommendations of the panels that reviewed 
WHO’s response to Ebola, WHO launched the Health Emergencies Program; 
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the 2018–2019 WHO budget provides $554.2 million in financing.205 The 
Program aimed to “deliver rapid, predictable, and comprehensive support to 
countries and communities as they prepared for, faced, or recovered from 
emergencies caused by any type of hazard to human health, whether disease 
outbreaks, natural or man made disasters, or conflicts.”206 Designed to be agile 
and streamlined, it has one clear line of authority, one workforce, one budget, 
one set of rules and processes, and one set of standard performance metrics. It 
creates a common structure combining infectious hazard management, country 
preparedness, health emergency information and risk assessment, emergency 
operations and management, and administration.207 Standard operating 
procedures are being developed to safeguard more coherent and clear 
responses and improve communication.208  
The Program will draw on existing strengths, partnering with U.N. 
agencies, States, and nongovernmental organizations, such as MSF. An 
Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee oversees and monitors 
progress of the Program. Yet, while the Committee has members from national 
governments, international organizations, and civil society, they are appointed 
by the Director-General,209 which potentially undermines its independence. 
2. Novel Funding Mechanisms: Contingency Fund for Emergencies  
The failure to provide a quick release of funds to the world’s most 
impacted countries is one of the most widely recognized causes of the rapid 
spread of Ebola in 2014. Even countries with resources can flounder; during 
the alarming spread of Zika throughout the Americas, it took Congress 233 
days to pass President Obama’s emergency request for funding—eventually 
agreeing to $1.1 billion ($800 million less than requested).210 This inertia 
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delayed the speed of research and development, including vital vaccines.211 
Delayed reactions following disease epidemics prompt the question, should an 
emergency fund be put in place that can rapidly deploy resources when an 
outbreak strikes?  
Two global initiatives aim to ensure the rapid flow of funding early in an 
outbreak. First, WHO launched an emergency contingency fund in the 
aftermath of Ebola alongside the Health Emergencies Programme. Yet, despite 
the clear need for flexible resources capable of rapid deployment, it is yet to be 
fully funded. Second, in 2016, World Bank President Jim Kim launched the 
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. 
a. WHO Emergency Contingency Fund 
Before the West African Ebola epidemic, WHO labored under the belief 
that it could mobilize funds rapidly in the face of a crisis. But the absence of 
readily available resources led to fatal delays.212 Therefore, the World Health 
Assembly launched a specific, replenishable contingency fund with a target 
capitalization of $100 million.213 The Contingency Fund for Emergencies 
seeks to fill a critical gap from the beginning of an emergency until resources 
from other financing mechanisms begin to flow, but only for a maximum of 
three months.214  
The fund is financed by flexible voluntary contributions, not additional 
core funding through mandatory assessed dues.215 If one considers the billions 
of dollars in humanitarian assistance, $100 million seems inadequate. Further, 
as of June 2017, the fund is far from meeting even this modest target—with 
contributions amounting to a mere $41 million.216 Adding resources to WHO’s 
core budget would have been more viable and sustainable. The program has 
echoes of the African Public Health Emergency Fund, which began 
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disbursements to countries to help them respond to public health emergencies, 
including disease outbreaks, and natural and manmade disasters. Yet, from 
2012 to 2016, only thirteen African nations contributed a total of less than 
$4 million.217 
The trigger point for deployment of the fund is also important. The agency 
plans to use its Emergency Response Framework grading system as the prompt 
for drawing down the contingency fund, although the Assembly left the final 
decision to the Director-General to determine when to deploy the emergency 
fund for Grade 3 emergencies, the highest on the scale.218 To be effective, the 
contingency fund must be commensurate with the need, sustainable, available 
for rapid use, and of global reach. 
b. Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility 
In 2016, World Bank President Jim Kim launched the Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). The PEF is an insurance mechanism that 
aims to rapidly provide funding for lower-income countries facing epidemic 
outbreaks before they turn into pandemics.219 The PEF will be financed 
through mobilizing and leveraging resources from the private sector 
(reinsurance and capital markets) and the public sector, and disbursing them 
quickly to governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and other agencies.220 
PEF thereby functions as the first-ever insurance market for pandemics, 
capable of rapidly disbursing financial resources for pandemic outbreaks. It 
further marks the first instance in which World Bank has issued catastrophe 
bonds for controlling infectious diseases.221 In the event of an outbreak, funds 
are released based on “parametric triggers” to the world’s poorest countries 
and international responders alike.222 The funding consists of an “insurance 
window,” funded from a private insurance market and a “cash window,” 
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funded by donors.223 The cash window is a more flexible source of funds and 
may be used to combat pathogens that are not dangerous enough to reach the 
criteria for the insurance window.  
Any country that qualifies for funding from the International Development 
Agency (IDA), which finances the world’s poorest countries, will also be 
eligible for funding from the PEF.224 Disease-causing viruses, such as new 
influenza virus, coronaviruses, and filoviruses, are within the scope of PEF. 
The World Bank estimates that if the PEF had existed in 2014, $100 million 
could have been mobilized within three months, averting loss of life.225  
The PEF is an important development, but requires adequate stewardship 
by States. The cash window depends on donations. So far Japan and Germany 
have committed $50 million, but since then, the PEF has not seen any 
significant new funding from States.226 Further, the parametric trigger for 
funds to be released has yet to be decided. What is WHO’s role? It further 
remains unclear whether the IHR will govern PEF. The WHO Director-
General could determine when the fund should be triggered, thereby 
combining the expertise of WHO with the financial resources of the World 
Bank. Further, entities that violate the IHR could be ordered to donate to the 
private insurance fund of the PEF. These two remedies, however, face practical 
and legal challenges. For example, if WHO vouches for the PEF and triggers 
its payouts, might the agency violate securities regulations or otherwise incur 
liability? 
3. Global Health Workforce 
As part of the Emergencies Program, WHO also developed a new Global 
Health Emergency Workforce (GHEW) of independently verified teams of 
capable responders from governments and civil society on standby to join 
WHO and others in an emergency response, while supporting national 
capacity.227 During the Ebola epidemic, international responders “faced 
challenges in terms of scale, quality assurance, training, coordination, 
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financing and opportunities to share lessons learnt between and among 
deploying partners.”228 The new GHEW is made up of national and 
international responders from networks and partnerships, including the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), which pools human 
resources and equipment, and the U.N. Inter-Agency Standing Committee.229 It 
“aims to improve coordination, readiness and quality assurance in the 
deployment” of Global Emergency Medical Teams (EMT).230  
The new unit is designed for speed and flexibility, “showing what must 
happen within 24, 48, and 72 hours, not months.”231 The EMT list sets 
international minimum standards that teams must meet to be registered and 
successfully vetted. This assures Member States that teams meet the required 
standards.232 WHO is also adding logisticians and experts in risk 
communication to its emergency staff.233 
Yet, a global health workforce cannot be effective unless barriers to its 
deployment are dismantled. During Ebola, airlines cancelled more than a third 
of flights to West Africa,234 impeding the arrival of response teams, equipment, 
and humanitarian aid. Some countries also restricted entry of anyone coming 
from the region by erecting mandatory quarantines, as occurred in the United 
States in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.235 Even Ebola-affected States 
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refused or delayed to issue visas to emergency workers.236 Systems must be put 
in place to expedite visas for foreign workers and permits to allow entry of 
essential medical and humanitarian supplies. If health workers fall ill, there is 
an ethical duty to provide the most effective available treatment and, if 
necessary, medical evacuation. 
4. Harnessing the U.N. System 
Finally, while WHO should take the lead in a global health emergency, the 
U.N. system can bolster security through enhancing legitimacy, improving 
coordination, and stiffening political resolve. Where a public health crisis 
reaches the highest levels of emergency,237 WHO should look to the United 
Nations for reinforcement. Unlike the Director-General or World Health 
Assembly, the U.N. Security Council can issue binding resolutions.238 In 2014, 
the Security Council adopted a resolution declaring the Ebola epidemic a 
“threat to international peace and security.”239 The Ebola resolution was only 
the second time in its history that the Security Council acted to stem a public 
health threat (AIDS was the first).240 To cement this role, one of the post-Ebola 
review panels recommended a standing health committee within the Security 
Council and a permanent U.N. “Accountability Commission” providing 
system-wide assessments of international responses to major epidemics.241 The 
U.N. Secretary General’s panel would have preferred to house the Standing 
Committee with the General Assembly.242 Irrespective of where the standing 
oversight function is placed, having the United Nations keep a watchful eye 
over fast-moving epidemics would bolster political attention.  
In September 2014, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon established the 
United Nations’ first-ever emergency health mission, the United Nations 
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER).243 Although it had 
undoubted flaws, UNMEER can serve as a model for future outbreaks that 
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require a major U.N.-wide response. Its mandate was to lead and coordinate 
the activities of U.N. agencies working on the ground to stop the outbreak. 
UNMEER adopted a regional perspective and improved cross-border 
coordination, information sharing, and monitoring of viral transmission. Yet, 
while UNMEER galvanized political support, it bypassed existing 
humanitarian systems, such as the U.N. Cluster, and was perceived as 
unwieldy.244 
The Ebola outbreak placed a spotlight on the ineffectiveness of 
international governance, in particular WHO, in responding to infectious 
disease outbreaks. Yet, whether the international community will act decisively 
on the recommendations issued by multiple commissions remains to be seen. 
Through addressing governance reforms, such as better internal and external 
coordination, and more effective and transparent decision making, WHO can 
more effectively meet its mission. Ultimately, WHO remains dependent on its 
Member States for increased funding, political support, and implementation of 
its norms. Will Member States pull back from populist trends and empower an 
effective WHO? 
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Table II: Four Global Commissions to Advance Global Governance—
WHO Emergency Operations and Response245 
E. Resilient Health Systems: The Foundation of Global Health Security 
Since Ebola was first identified in 1976, there have been at least fifteen 
outbreaks in Sub-Saharan Africa; before 2014, all had been rapidly 
contained.246 Why was the West African epidemic so much worse? Part of the 
answer lies in the weak health systems of the countries affected. In countries 
with a well-functioning health system, outbreaks can be rapidly brought under 
control—as occurred when Nigeria experienced a worrying outbreak at the 
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height of the Ebola epidemic.247 In contrast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea 
had among the world’s lowest-ranking healthcare systems.248 
Creating effective health systems is therefore both a public health and legal 
imperative. The global health system is only as strong as the weakest health 
system. Wealthy countries depend on developing States’ capacity to detect and 
then halt the spread of disease before it spills over international borders. 
Accordingly, uniformly strong health systems are not simply in the interests of 
lower-income States.  
From a public health perspective, how a society orders, finances, regulates, 
and monitors national health systems implicates who lives and who dies. How 
should a health system function? WHO specifies six “building blocks”: 
“(i) service delivery, (ii) health workforce, (iii) health information systems, 
(iv) access to essential [vaccines and] medicines, (v) financing, and 
(vi) leadership/governance.”249 These require adequate and equitable 
distribution of in-hospital and community health services, trained health 
workers, essential vaccines and medicines, and health information systems.250 
Importantly, good health systems focus on population-based services, 
including surveillance, health education, sanitation, hygiene, and vector control 
(such as controlling mosquito breeding grounds).251 
A strong health system reduces disease transmissibility and susceptibility, 
as it ensures that all individuals have prompt access to care. For example, 
“treatment as prevention” for HIV/AIDS has been a stunning success.252 
Individuals on strict regimens of antiretroviral treatment (ART) are virtually 
unable to transmit the virus, while pre-exposure HIV prophylaxis (PrEP) can 
significantly reduce susceptibility to the virus.253 But when individuals cannot 
 
 247 See Successful Ebola Responses in Nigeria, Senegal and Mali, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/nigeria/en/. 
 248 See Ajay Tandon et al., Measuring Overall Health System Performance for 191 Countries, (World 
Health Org. GPE Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 30, 2000), http://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf. 
 249 MONITORING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS: A HANDBOOK OF INDICATORS AND THEIR 
MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES, at vi, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2010) [hereinafter MONITORING 
THE BUILDING BLOCKS]. 
 250 Id. at xi–xii. 
 251 See generally id. 
 252 HIV Treatment as Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
hiv/risk/art/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 253 See generally Michael Hagmann, Study Confirms Effectiveness of Antiretroviral Drugs for HIV 
Patients, 81 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 918 (2003); Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
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access or afford countermeasures,254 how can a community be immune to a 
controllable disease or be protected by the herd immunity that prevents the 
spread of disease?255  
Across the globe, individuals struggle to access basic health services. Many 
countries have wholly inadequate health facilities. In West Africa, during the 
Ebola outbreak, poor road systems and inadequate transportation made it 
difficult for patients to travel to treatment centers and for blood samples to get 
to laboratories,256 imposing harmful—and sometimes fatal—delays. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, about 40% of tuberculosis cases were detected and 
successfully treated in 2013; in South Asia, this figure was about 50%; and in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, this number was less than 60%.257 The 
inaccessibility of care impacts everything from immunization rates to 
availability of clean water and sanitation to outbreak prevention and 
response.258  
Even if patients reach a hospital, there may be no staff to offer treatment.259 
Indeed, an inadequate public health workforce was a central factor during the 
Ebola epidemic. There were too few trained epidemiologists and laboratory 
workers, and poor infection control in clinics and hospitals.260 Health workers 
used personal protective equipment (PPE) sporadically and inconsistently, 
sometimes repeatedly using single-use disposable PPE.261 Many facilities 
suffered from staff shortages, insufficient soap and other hygienic supplies, 
and limited capacity to safely dispose of contaminated waste.262 Thus, 
tragically, 881 doctors, nurses, and midwives contracted Ebola during the West 
 
 254 Hagmann, supra note 253. 
 255 See generally Paul E.M. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 
265 (1993). 
 256 See Factors that Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded Rapid 
Containment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/ 
en/. 
 257 See TRACKING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] & WORLD 
BANK GROUP [WBG] 75 (2015). 
 258 See id. at 18. 
 259 See Irene Garcia-Subirats et al., Barriers in Access to Healthcare in Countries with Different Health 
Systems. A Cross-Sectional Study in Municipalities of Central Colombia and North-Eastern Brazil, 106 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 204, 208 (2014). 
 260 Kevin Sack et al., How Ebola Roared Back, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/30/health/how-ebola-roared-back.html?mcubz=3. 
 261 See HEALTH WORKER EBOLA INFECTIONS IN GUINEA, LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: A PRELIMINARY 
REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 10 (2015). 
 262 See id. 
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Africa Ebola epidemic, 513 of whom died from the virus.263 Without better 
preparation, training, and tools, the health workforce will not only experience 
its own losses, but be less effective in controlling the next outbreak.  
To remedy this, governments must promote worker education and retention 
by prioritizing a well-trained and sustainable health workforce.264 In November 
of 2013, WHO reported a deficit of 7.2 million health workers; by 2035, that 
number is expected to increase to 12.9 million.265 The problem stems largely 
from low-quality or insufficient training and failure to retain professionals, 
many of whom are drawn by the lure of richer countries. Only 168 medical 
schools exist across all forty-seven Sub-Saharan African countries; eleven 
countries have no medical schools, and twenty-four countries have only one.266 
Without greater investments, a strong health force is illusory. 
A novel outbreak can lead to a breakdown in routine care in already 
stretched systems. During the Ebola outbreak, ill-prepared hospitals shut down 
to prevent in-hospital-transmission of the virus; emergency obstetric care 
decreased dramatically, leading to increased maternal mortality.267 Staff 
shortages required reducing hospital capacity.268 Patients attending healthcare 
facilities to treat noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) declined;269 while routine 
immunization services were disrupted.270 The Ebola epidemic instigated a 50% 
reduction in malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV treatment services in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. With the wholesale breakdown in care and the 
diversion of funding to fight Ebola, people succumbed to everyday diseases; 
by the end of the outbreak, an estimated 10,623 additional people died of HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria.271  
 
 263 See EBOLA SITUATION REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 3 (2015); see also Cost of 
the Ebola Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/ 
2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html (last visited July 3, 2017). 
 264 See ANNA NICHOLSON ET AL., GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK: RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE 
HEALTH SYSTEMS TO RESPOND TO GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS 38, 41 (2016). 
 265 Global Health Workforce Shortage to Reach 12.9 Million in Coming Decades, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/health-workforce-shortage/en/. 
 266 See id. 
 267 See Kim J. Brolin Ribacke et al., The Impact of the West Africa Ebola Outbreak on Obstetric Health 
Care in Sierra Leone, PLOS ONE 2 (Feb. 24, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0150080 (discussing the negative repercussions of the Ebola outbreak on maternal health care). 
 268 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 269  T. Samba et al., Non-communicable Diseases in the Western Area District, Sierra Leone, Before and 
During the Ebola Outbreak, 7 PUB. HEALTH ACTION SUPP. S16, S20 (2017).  
 270 See J.W.T. Elston et al., Impact of the Ebola Outbreak on Health Systems and Population Health in 
Sierra Leone, 38 J. PUB. HEALTH 674, 674–75 (2015).  
 271 See Alyssa S. Parpia et al., Effects of Response to 2014–2015 Ebola Outbreak on Deaths from 
Malaria, HIV/AIDS, and Tuberculosis, West Africa, 22 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 433, 439 (2016); see 
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Many low-resource countries, particularly in Africa, lack the diagnostic, 
tracking, and reporting tools necessary for a strong disease surveillance 
system,272 leaving disease incidence woefully misunderstood and 
underreported. Without effective surveillance, outbreak detection and 
assessment becomes disorganized, and response too often fails.273 Essential 
medicines, including antibiotics and antiviral medications, are often 
unavailable to individuals in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Western 
Pacific.274 Substandard and falsified medications can create antibiotic 
resistance and harm efforts to contain the spread of disease.275 Laws, 
regulations, and policies must be in place to manage the health system.276  
If an infectious disease outbreak takes hold, States with robust health 
systems will have the power to mitigate its impact. Health systems with 
capable disease surveillance can detect a disease risk quickly, assess that risk, 
and respond accordingly.277 Outbreak preparedness includes having well-
designed plans and protocols in place, as well as stockpiling vaccines, 
medicines, and personal protective equipment.278 Without sound preparation, 
health ministries, providers, and communities can waste valuable time making 
decisions about how to respond rather than executing an already well-devised 
plan. That critical period can constitute the difference in how quickly and 
extensively an infectious disease spreads.  
The public health system is also the first line of defense against 
bioterrorism—the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other agents to 
 
also Cost of the Ebola Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ 
ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/cost-of-ebola.html (last visited July 3, 2017). 
 272 Ernest Tambo et al., Need of Surveillance Response Systems to Combat Ebola Outbreaks and Other 
Emerging Infectious Diseases in African Countries, 3 INFECTIOUS DISEASES POVERTY, 2014, at 1, 5. 
 273 See NICHOLSON ET AL., supra note 264, at 65–66. 
 274 See Sheila Mysorekar, Silent Murder, International Relations and Cooperation, DEV. & 
COOPERATION (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/medicines-are-too-expensive-poor-people-developing-
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WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2015) (listing of medicines to fulfill the minimal medical needs for 
the priority diseases in a basic health-care system). 
 275 Atholl Johnston & David W. Holt, Substandard Drugs: A Potential Crisis for Public Health, 78 
BRITISH J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 218, 225–27 (2014). 
 276 See Roger Magnusson et al., ADVANCING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: THE VITAL ROLE OF LAW, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1–2 (2017). 
 277 See generally PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA 
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2011), 
[hereinafter PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK]. 
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cause illness or death in people, and also in animals or plants.279 The “health 
care system should rapidly identify threats, help to prevent the spread of 
disease in the population, and care for infected patients.”280 The threat is so 
grave that, under international law, the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, and stockpiling 
biological weapons.281 However, in the absence of a formal verification regime 
to monitor compliance, the BWC has limited effectiveness. States Parties, 
moreover, have thus far failed to adopt a supplementary protocol authorizing 
objective verification. Further, implementation capacities for the BWC are 
underfunded.282 The 1997 U.N. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings also makes the use of biological weapons against a civilian 
population a war crime, and potentially a crime against humanity.283 Still, 
criminal and political sanction cannot supplement adequate preparedness 
through a responsive health system. 
Finally, to ensure global health security, health must be reflected across 
government, including through a “One Health” approach. This holistic 
response to infectious disease involves forging links between scientists and 
ministries concerned with human and animal health. It focuses on zoonotic 
diseases that spread from animals to humans, such as HIV, Ebola, and 
SARS.284 WHO and the OIE recognize the importance of the approach and 
have accordingly established an operational framework.285  
One Health recognizes that monitoring diseases in animals can serve as an 
early warning; West Nile virus often kills birds before humans experience 
symptoms, for example.286 Further, preventing disease in animals can reduce 
 
 279 See David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 7–8 
(2002). 
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Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, Mar. 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 
583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
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BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 3, 2017), http://thebulletin.org/can-bill-gates-rescue-bioweapons-convention10665. 
 283 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256. 
 284 See One Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/ (last 
updated Aug. 4, 2017). 
 285 See WHO-OIE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE HUMAN-ANIMAL 
INTERFACE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] & WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH ix–x 
(2014). 
 286 See One Health, supra note 284. 
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transmission to humans.287 In India, dog vaccination brought a decline of 
human rabies cases to zero.288 Pursuing a One Health approach can be cost 
effective. In Canada, integrating animal and human facilities led to a 26% 
reduction in operation costs.289  
Similarly, a One Health approach to AMR addresses food production and 
the health system: going beyond highly targeted policies such as improved 
clinical and patient education. Broader reforms need to be socially and 
institutionally embedded, such as more humane food production, without 
intense factory farming that requires heavy antibiotic prophylaxis; health 
systems capable of controlling infections and testing for resistance; and law 
enforcement to prevent and prosecute trafficking in fake medicines. Political 
momentum is growing, such as the 2016 U.N. High-Level meeting and G7 
Health Ministers’ declaration on AMR, but it remains to be seen whether the 
world will spring into action in time.290 
1. States’ Duties to Conform to Global Norms 
States are legally obliged to prepare for, and effectively respond to, disease 
outbreaks. At the international level, states have committed to prioritizing 
strong health systems through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the 
IHR, and the right to health. The IHR are legally binding on all 196 States 
Parties. Further, all WHO Member States (except South Sudan) have ratified at 
least one international treaty committed to upholding the right to health.291 The 
Constitution of the WHO also recognizes a right to health, while the Alma Ata 
declaration proclaimed a goal of “health for all” in 1978.292 Furthermore, the 
right to health is incorporated into many national constitutions and domestic 
statutes, legally binding a government to ensure that the national health system 
realizes and maintains that right.293 
 
 287 See One Health Basics: Zoonotic Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/basics/zoonotic-diseases.html (last updated July 14, 2017). 
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 289 See id. at x. 
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(2014). 
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DECLARATION OF ALMA ATA, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] arts. 2–3 (Sept. 6–12, 1978). 
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2. The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
Post-World War II, the international community enshrined health as a 
global public good, creating a trilogy of inspirational instruments. On 
December 10, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a common standard for the universal 
respect for human rights, including the right to health.294 In the ensuing years, 
States have negotiated further international human rights treaties, enshrining a 
raft of rights relating to good health, including the rights to health, to life, and 
to a safe environment, without discrimination.295 Yet, accountability for 
adherence to the right to health is weak. While human rights treaty bodies 
require State reporting and permit “shadow” reporting by civil society 
organizations, they cannot coerce States to adhere to treaty norms.296 Human 
rights abuses, including abuses of the right to health, remain common.297 
3. The Sustainable Development Goals 
Building on existing commitments, in 2015, 193 United Nations Member 
States adopted the SDGs, with a bold vision: healthy people living on a 
habitable planet. Goal 3 addresses health, whereby governments agree to 
“[e]nsure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.”298 Universal 
health coverage (UHC) is one of the most important health targets: quality 
promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative, and palliative health services; 
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access to safe, effective, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines; and 
protection from financial hardship.299  
The SDGs are not legally binding, but aspirational goals.300 Despite the 
absence of formal legal authority, the SDGs still embed a collective 
international responsibility to ensure good health. While they aspire to vastly 
reduce poverty and ill health, the SDGs will require resource mobilization, 
measurable indicators, and accountability mechanisms.  
4. International Health Regulations 
While the SDGs and the right to health set high-level norms for robust 
health systems, the IHR impose specific and concrete obligations on states to 
develop national capacities to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks.301 Yet 
by 2014, little more than 30% of States Parties reported meeting these 
responsibilities.302 Further, the noncompliance rate is likely higher, as this is 
based on self-evaluation. High-income states have not offered developing 
countries the resources needed to shore up core capacities, despite IHR 
language encouraging collaboration.303 WHO, moreover, cannot impose 
sanctions on states for failing to fulfill responsibilities, and the agency does not 
have many incentives to offer to non-complying states. Crucial reforms include 
rigorous matrices for meeting health system capacities, independent external 
evaluations, transparency, and accountability.304 
In 2016, WHO announced a new framework to monitor IHR core 
capacities, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE).305 JEE, which integrates and 
improves upon President Obama’s Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 
matrices,306 relies on external independent experts working alongside national 
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health officials, with outcomes made fully transparent.307 Governments are 
then expected to develop country action plans. JEE is voluntary; as of 2017, 
thirty-three States had completed evaluations, with thirty-two more planning to 
undertake the JEE.308 However, there is a five-year interval between JEE 
evaluations,309 which is too long given the need for up-to-date capacities. 
WHO also encourages States to conduct in-country simulations, such as 
“tabletop” exercises—role-playing a national health emergency.310 
Still, the IHR is unlikely to reach its full potential unless political leaders 
prioritize funding and empower WHO. The JEE is critically underfunded. 
While the GHSA provided $1 billion toward building and evaluating core 
capacities,311 the Trump Administration is unlikely to reauthorize GHSA 
funding. The World Bank’s PEF could condition grants based on completion 
of the JEE process, but PEF itself is narrowly focused and under-funded.312 
One approach could be for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to include 
national preparedness in its macro-economic assessments. Countries pay close 
attention to IMF assessments because it expands their access to capital.313 
Long-term, sustainable funding is necessary to guarantee effectiveness. 
F. Equitable Research and Development 
When novel diseases take hold and spread, particularly in lower-income 
countries, the absence of effective vaccines and treatments is painfully 
obvious. Think about most of the major global health crises in recent 
memory—there were few, if any, medical countermeasures in the research and 
development (R&D) pipeline. From SARS and MERS, to Ebola and Zika, 
nations were bereft of effective countermeasures, instead left to implement 
crude responses such as isolation and quarantine, along with fever-screening at 
the borders. 
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How do states transition from a landscape of underinvestment and delayed 
R&D for infectious diseases—whether ancient scourges like tuberculosis, 
reemerging infections like Ebola, or AMR pathogens—to robust investment 
and rapid deployment? Emerging and resurgent infectious diseases demand 
tools and technologies, such as vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, personal 
protective equipment, and medical devices. Yet, novel infectious diseases lack 
market-driven incentives: the next epidemic is difficult to predict and likely to 
hit poor countries first.  
As evident from the Ebola commission reports, an effective R&D strategy 
requires an international coordinating entity; sustainable investments; 
convergence of diverse regulatory pathways; and access to intellectual 
property, data, and biological samples—ensuring rigorous scientific 
standards.314 To ensure rapid rollout of medical countermeasures, the R&D 
community must cultivate knowledge and products ready for advanced 
development when an outbreak strikes. The potential of medical 
countermeasures to contain outbreaks or minimize harm make them vital 
investments. How do we transition from an R&D landscape where a vaccine 
can take over ten years to develop315 to investment and rapid deployment? 
Have recent initiatives gone far enough?  
1. Perverse R&D Incentives Fueling Health Inequalities 
Pharmaceutical companies have financial incentives to invest in treatments 
for “profitable” diseases, not novel viruses or diseases endemic in poor 
countries. Diseases like tuberculosis that are concentrated among poorer, 
marginalized populations have a low global priority for research and 
development. For instance, for decades, research into new drugs for 
tuberculosis all but ground to a halt—leaving patients with complex, lengthy 
drug regimens with, particularly for multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, serious 
side effects. With a renewed focus on tuberculosis following the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), funding for tuberculosis R&D rose from $358 
million in 2005 to $637 million in 2009.316 Yet, it remains only a fraction of 
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what is needed.317 Strategic investments in and altered incentive systems for 
R&D could restock the antimicrobial pipeline. For instance, a modest security 
dividend of $16 billion every ten years could support fifteen new drugs.318 
Like tuberculosis, Ebola and Zika are not new diseases—Ebola emerged 
nearly four decades ago, and Zika was first detected in humans in 1952.319 Yet, 
in recent outbreaks, countermeasures were not prioritized, and when they 
escalated into global health emergencies, there was no operational vaccine. 
This inertia is attributable not to biology and science, but the low priority, 
limited funding, and practical challenges of conducting human trials for 
episodic infections. A mere $3.2 billion was invested in R&D of more than 
twenty neglected diseases in 2013, compared to $500 million for Ebola when 
the outbreak occurred.320 Driven by the recent outbreak, an Ebola vaccine—
rVSV-ZEBOV—is now in the final stages, but it required major investments 
from both public and private entities.321 This vaccine is in fact not new; it was 
first created in 2003, but stalled due to prohibitive costs, which the countries 
known to experience Ebola were ill-equipped to pay.322 But will those without 
the means be able to access the vaccine in time? Despite huge public 
investments in developing a Zika vaccine, the United States controversially 
sold exclusive rights of a potential vaccine to a pharmaceutical company, 
meaning that States affected by Zika may have to buy the vaccine back at 
exorbitant costs.323 
While international law recognizes the need for exceptions to strict patent 
protections in these emergency situations, States are often unwilling or unable 
to exercise these rights. For instance, the Doha Declaration underscores States’ 
rights to use flexibilities that provide exceptions and limitations to improve 
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availability and accessibility of essential medicines.324 The Declaration further 
provides for compulsory licensing325 and parallel importation of patented 
medicines for countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities.326 Yet, 
politics, pressure from industry, and lack of legal capacity often inhibit States’ 
abilities to exercise these protections, meaning that nationals lack access to life 
saving countermeasures.327 
2. Solidarity Through WHO 
To address these limitations, WHO should prioritize potentially high-value 
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapies for pathogens with pandemic potential as 
well as their equitable distribution. To enable researchers to develop a vaccine 
for novel pathogens, the first step is to identify, and then share the pathogen. In 
the case of pandemic influenza, WHO Member States have agreed on 
innovative global governance arrangements. WHO’s Global Influenza 
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS)—formerly the Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network—serves as a global alert system for the emergence of 
influenza with pandemic potential. GISRS monitors the evolution of influenza 
viruses and provides recommendations regarding laboratory diagnostics, 
vaccines, antiviral susceptibility, and risk assessment.328  
GISRS, however, is a non-binding system, which means that states are not 
mandated to share virus samples with WHO laboratories. In 2007, the system 
was shaken by Indonesia’s assertion of sovereignty, grounded on the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, over influenza A(H5N1) isolated within 
its territory. Indonesia argued that pharmaceutical companies were gaining free 
access to its nationals’ “property,” only to sell the eventual vaccine back at 
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exorbitant costs.329 This was not without grounds; during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, wealthy countries had agreements with pharma companies that 
enabled them to access the vaccine, whereas poorer countries did not.330  
Following Indonesia’s refusal to share the virus, WHO adopted the 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework in May 2011, following 
years of tense negotiations.331 The framework is a landmark in global 
governance for health, representing the first international agreement on 
influenza virus and benefit sharing. States commit to voluntarily share viruses 
with GISRS, guided by the principle of solidarity. While the framework is not 
legally binding on States, companies enter binding contracts where they agree 
to make contributions to WHO, providing benefits to developing countries 
(such as vaccine donations and granting royalty-free licenses to manufacturers 
in developing countries) in exchange for access to biological materials needed 
for R&D. The PIP Framework, however, does not expressly cover genetic 
sequencing data that are increasingly used to transfer knowledge. Nor does it 
cover non-pandemic influenza materials or, for that matter, any other pathogen, 
such as Ebola, Zika, or corona viruses. Therefore, it is necessary to extend 
these protections to other types of viruses to ensure equitable distribution. 
3. Galvanizing Action 
The failure of industry to swiftly and equitably develop vaccines has 
galvanized international action. For instance, the U.N. High-Level Panel 
recommended developing a $1 billion funding mechanism. The panel advised 
that funds should be directed to global priorities, abiding by the principles of 
open access and data sharing, and that research products should be treated as 
public goods.332 
Firstly, responding to recommendations for greater engagement from 
WHO in R&D, 333 WHO established an R&D Blueprint for Action to reduce 
delay between declaring an emergency and the availability of medical 
interventions.334 It will include a Global Coordination Mechanism (GCM) with 
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WHO at the helm.335 The Blueprint’s focus includes: prioritization of a 
shortlist of pathogens most likely to lead to epidemics, developing an 
operational plan to transition from preparedness to response, identifying 
research priorities for urgent pathogens, coordinating stakeholders and 
expanding capacity, assessing preparedness and impact of intervention, and 
exploring funding models for R&D preparedness and response.336 
Secondly, and drawing on the Blueprint, CEPI was launched in January 
2017 at the World Economic Forum. CEPI is a partnership between 
governments and the private sector, including the Gates Foundation and 
leading pharmaceutical companies. It focuses on prioritizing global infectious 
disease threats, identifying research priorities, global coordination and 
expanding capacity, continuous assessment, and mobilizing funding.337  
CEPI aims to stimulate the development of new vaccines against diseases 
that could cause the next devastating epidemic but do not offer a sufficient 
economic incentive for pharmaceutical companies. For now, CEPI is focusing 
on three diseases (MERS, Nipah, and Lassa fever), bringing vaccines from 
development through preclinical research.338 The vaccines will then be stored 
in a holding pattern until an outbreak, and they can be rapidly tested and 
accelerated toward manufacture deployment. CEPI has already raised 
$540 million, with pledges totaling $790 million.339 
Accelerated research is also needed to maximize knowledge of pathogens 
with pandemic potential, including hundreds yet to be discovered, establishing 
a foundation of knowledge for outbreak detection and future research. Since 
2009, one such effort, the PREDICT project, has identified more than 820 
novel viruses in wild animals and humans in thirty countries.340 Such efforts 
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are eminently affordable—$175 million is supporting PREDICT’s work in 
thirty-five countries341 —and need to be brought to scale in every country. 
At the same time, scientific freedom and biosecurity must be balanced. 
While open research is vital to scientific breakthroughs, dual use research of 
concern can also pose biosecurity threats, especially in less secure facilities. 
Researchers could further recreate an ancient virus, like smallpox, which could 
either improve the existing vaccine or be potentially manipulated to form a 
dangerous virus.342 While access to certain genetic materials, like smallpox, is 
prohibited, other materials are easy to access through the internet. Dual use 
research of concern goes through an extra round of review in the United States, 
while WHO cautions that no institution should hold more than 20% of the 
smallpox virus’s genome.343 Yet, there are no universal rules, and biosecurity 
measures vary considerably. Even if there were rules, it is near impossible to 
monitor every company in the world. 
Effective R&D for global health security requires investment from multiple 
actors. As pharma companies often lack financial incentives, nation States and 
private donors should support and invest in an R&D agenda driven by equity, 
solidarity, and economic sense. Otherwise, when the next epidemic strikes—be 
it severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome, Nipah, or a yet unheard-of 
pathogen—the international community will be as ill prepared as ever.  
G. Effectively Communicating Public Health Messages 
Lastly, failures in communication systems between health workers, 
patients, community members, and public health officials undermine timely, 
transparent, and accurate information during an outbreak.344 Outbreaks trigger 
panic and can undermine the trust that is central to an effective response. The 
devastation caused by Ebola was escalated by a deep distrust among 
communities of the government and foreigners, as their governments had a 
history of corruption, poor governance, and even brutality.345 This created 
major obstacles for WHO, governments, and other responders, as people failed 
to heed public health messages. 
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Yet, public authorities often overreact, and reach for counterproductive 
measures that drive fear. During the SARS epidemic of 2003, China and 
Singapore employed mass quarantines, sometimes monitored by guards or 
ankle bracelets.346 In Taiwan, over 150,000 individuals were quarantined, 
although there were only twenty-four confirmed cases.347 In the Republic of 
Korea, breaking quarantine for MERS-CoV was made a criminal offense, 
risking up to two years in prison.348 Where nations target the vulnerable or 
neglect disadvantaged groups, they erode the values necessary to promote 
public trust. During the West African Ebola outbreak, authorities in Liberia 
cordoned off the West Point slum of the capital where the disease was rapidly 
spreading.349 Cordon sanitaire imposes enormous social, economic, and trust 
costs for very few benefits. There are few instances where it is appropriate. 
Riots broke out, and in the chaos, authorities shot a fifteen-year-old boy.350 
Poor communication exacerbated the distrust, led to resistance, and eventually 
resulted in violence. In one horrifying instance, villagers in rural Guinea 
attacked and killed eight health workers and journalists.351  
Instead, to build trust and stability, governments’ responses to outbreaks 
must be driven by solidarity. Vulnerable communities should not be 
abandoned. Health authorities should mitigate fear and promote trust by 
providing evidence-based prevention and adequate treatment. States should 
further strive for a more coherent balance between individual freedoms and 
public health necessity. In light of states’ obligations under international 
human rights law, public health powers are not unlimited, but must be 
exercised in a manner proportionate to the threat, and should be non-
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discriminatory and evidence-based. Any infringement of liberty must be the 
least restrictive alternative.352  
The Ebola epidemic also illustrated how cultural factors can facilitate the 
spread of disease, and the importance of conveying and implementing public 
health messages in a manner that is culturally sensitive. With burial rituals a 
key factor in the spread of Ebola in the region, WHO and others failed to 
appreciate the value of an anthropological approach to stopping the 
epidemic.353 A traditional funeral and burial ceremony of an Ebola-infected 
deceased person resulted in more than 300 new Ebola cases.354 Health workers 
belatedly pursued the support of community leaders, who were persuaded to 
adapt cultural beliefs, such as burial practices, in light of the emergency.355 
Lately, WHO has supported the deployment of anthropologists to help 
understand local culture, behavior and traditions.356 Control measures like 
changes to burial practices and quarantine require deep local cultural 
knowledge, which civil society, the community, and experts can bring. Again, 
trust between communities and officials is vital. 
Further, mass media, including social networking, can either be a tool for 
fighting infectious disease or an instigator for greater spread. During an 
outbreak, people are desperate for any useful information, regardless of its 
source (traditional mass media, such as radio, television, or newspaper; or 
social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube). However, the 
information circulated on social media could be misleading or dangerously 
incorrect. For example, during the West African Ebola outbreak, media 
overreaction in the United States fueled panic and calls for unwarranted 
restrictions.357 In the affected regions, medical misinformation (such as using 
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the plant ewedu as a “cure,” blood transfusions, and drinking salty water) was 
commonly tweeted.358 Therefore, public health authorities and community 
leaders should promote trustworthy sources, while debunking false 
information.  
To build trust and public ownership, effective public health interventions 
should harness public support. Community-driven solutions can effectively 
tailor disease control approaches to local needs. Still, communities may reject 
novel approaches where their concerns are not adequately alleviated. In the 
United States, constituencies in Monroe County voted fifty-eight to forty-two 
in favor of releasing genetically modified mosquitoes that could reduce 
populations of Aedes aegypti. But, the community of Key Haven, where the 
mosquitoes would be released, opposed the resolution by a sixty-five to thirty-
five margin.359 Therefore, the populations most affected must be central to any 
response. 
Accordingly, governments should liaise with the community to ensure 
viable public health measures. In response to ongoing circulating avian 
influenzas, Chinese authorities sometimes shut down live poultry markets. 
While this appears to be effective in reducing virus transmission, permanent 
closures lack public support. High percentages of Chinese prefer to buy from 
wet markets to ensure their meat is fresh. Instead, less disruptive practices may 
be more effective, such as separating types of poultry by species, redesigning 
poultry cages, and closing the markets for off-days.360  
CONCLUSION: FROM AN UNVIRTUOUS CYCLE OF COMPLACENCY AND PANIC 
TO GLOBAL HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 
This is a pivotal moment for the future of global health security—the West 
African Ebola outbreak has prompted renewed momentum. Here we set a clear 
path for beefing up epidemic preparedness. Instead of lurching from crisis to 
crisis, the international community should urgently translate the lessons 
learned into sustained investments in pandemic preparedness. Global solidarity 
and cooperation are more important than ever to address critical policy, 
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operational, and capacity barriers to global health security. Enhanced health 
security requires greater equity and fairness in the distribution of health 
services and resources. Ultimately, this requires robust investment, invigorated 
international and national leadership, resourced health systems, cutting-edge 
R&D, and trust and communication. If not, when the next pandemic hits, it 
might not be easily defeated. Unless the world acts now, global awareness will 
fade as we tumble toward the next public health crisis.  
